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WHAT THE CONFERENCE ACHIEVED 
TuE conference was held to assist in defining the viewpoint of the 
European Movement on the problems of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, in the light of the changes which have taken place since 
the Commission held its last conference more than ten years ago. It had 
the further object of stimulating greater interest in these problems among 
Parliamentarians in the Western European countries. 
These objects were achieved. Most of the main political parties in the 
countries of Western Europe were represented in the various delegations. 
Mr. Theo Lefevre, the Prime Minister of Belgium, joined the delegates for 
dinner on the first evening, together with many leading Belgian Parlia-
mentarians, including Monsieur Pierre Wigny, former Foreign Minister. 
And the conference reached important conclusions which are being con-
veyed to the Executive of the European Movement. 
SIR Edward Reddington-Behrens, President of Honour of the Commis-
sion, presided on the first day, and Senator Etienne de la Vallee Poussin, 
the Commission's Chairman, on the second day. The general conclusions 
were as follows: 
The principle of the European Movement that its ultimate objective is 
the unity of all Europe, including the Central and Eastern countries, was 
re-affirmed. The ideal of the European Movement that every individual 
should have the right to personal liberty, and that all countries should 
have the right to national self-determination, was upheld. 
As a means of lessening tension between East and West, and as a 
practical measure assisting the realisation of the above aims, the con-
ference supported increased economic exchanges and more cultural 
contacts between Eastern and Western Europe. 
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A MESSAGE TO THE CONFERENCE 
By THE. RT. HON. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P. 
President of Honour, Central and Eastern European Commission 
of the European Movement 
I AM glad to learn that the Central and Eastern European Commission 
of the European Movement is holding a conference in Brussels to discuss 
trade and cultural exchanges between Eastern and Western Europe. 
Though always affirming that a United Europe, to include all European 
countries, was its ultimate aim, the European Movement began its work 
by seeking to create unity and understanding among peoples in the West. 
When we look at Eastern and Western Europe we see two groups of 
The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, 
M.P. 
countries which have developed since the war in very different ways. This difference in recent experience 
calls for a special effort to bridge the gaps in our understanding of each other. 
The influence of the European Movement in Western Europe has powerfully aided the efforts of govern-
ments to reduce the barriers between our countries. Your conference is concerned with extending this influ-
ence into the field of relations between Eastern and Western Europe. In this, I wish it every success. 
If, as I hope, the tension between East and West continues to diminish, one of the results should surely be 
a growth in personal and institutional initiative in the countries of Eastern Europe. I am convinced that such 
development would contribute to the peace of the world. 
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Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens, President of Honour of the Central and Eastern European Commission, addressing the conference dinner. 
On his right are Mr. Theo Lefevre, Prime Minister of Belgium, and Senator Etienne de la Vallee Poussin, Chairman of the Commission. 
On his left are Monsieur Rene Mayer, former Prime Minister of France, and Lord St. Oswald, Vice-Chairman of the Commission. 
THE OBJECTIVES 
OF THE CONFERENCE 
Address by 
SIR EDWARD BEDDINGTON-BEHRENS, C.M.G., M.C. 
President of Honour, Central and Eastern European Commission 
of the Euro;>ean Movement 
EIGHTEEN months ago, the Euopean Movement held one of 
its biggest conferences in Munich. It was attended by more than 
1,000 delegates, and lasted for three days. Only one delegate from 
a Western country, during this conference mentioned in his speech 
the problem of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. 
Now this did not happen by design. It happened because other 
problems, such as the enlargement of the Common Market were 
uppermost in the minds of the delegates at that time. And I must 
stress that this omission was quite contrary to the whole tradition 
of the European Movement which, from its inception, has pro-
claimed that its ultimate aim is the union of all European coun-
tries. Today one of the greatest contributions which the European 
Movement can make towards achieving this union is to seek prac-
tical means of lessening of tension between East and West. 
The conference has set up two Commissio:is, which will examine 
practical steps for increasing economic exchanges between East 
and West and for intensifying cultural relations. And in the cul-
tural field it is net sufficient to exchange famous internatbnal stars 
of opera, ballet and music, but to share cultural ideas at all levels 
of society. We want to extend to these countries the hand of friend-
ship, so that if they are able and willing to join with us in drawing 
the countries of Eastern and Western Europe closer together, they 
may know the strength of the support in the West for this policy. 
I hope that this endeavour will be appreciated in Eastern Europe 
as much as I know it is supported here in the West. 
We must consider the plight of our European friends in Eastern 
Europe, who live under regimes very different from those we enjoy 
in our own countries. If we were not concerned in our hearts about 
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the future of these large populations - including the people of 
East Germany - then our enjoyment of our freedom and pros-
perity would be based on quicksand. Because the strength of de-
mocratic countries has always been their unquenchable belief in 
the right of personal freedom and their hatred of tyranny in any 
form. 
Naturally, it would be absurd to imagine that any evolution 
would bring back the pre-war regimes in Eastern Europe. I am 
sure that none of us are thinking along these lines. Nor is it to be 
assumed that, if Eastern European countries had greater freedom 
they would tum against Russia. One thing which impressed me, 
when I was in Bulgaria before the last war, was the devotion of 
the Bulgarian people to Russia, which had been responsible for 
their emancipation from the Turks. These are feelings which ex-
tend deep into national consciousness. If today the Bulgarians 
were given greater freedom to determine their destiny, this bond 
between the Bulgarians and the Russians might even be renewed 
and strengthened. 
Indeed, we should remember that experience in Austria has 
shown that the granting of freedom, and the consequent removal 
of tension from a particular area, can be of enormous benefit to 
Russia, just as it benefits all of us in Europe. 
It is my hope that, if the tension between East and West con-
tinues to diminish, Russia herself may see great advantage in 
allowing more freedom in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. As you all know if the nuclear bomb means anything as a 
deterrent, it is no longer necessary for Russia to be protected by 
hundreds of miles of satellite territory in order to feel secure. I 
myself believe that tension will continue to diminish, and that the 
less menacing atmosphere of recent months will become a per-
manent feature of relations between East and West. 
I believe this, for the simple reason that a war of conquest to 
spread Communism would be abhorrent to the Russian people. 
This is particularly true of the younger generation of industrial 
leaders and technicians in Russia, for whom the Communist ideo-
logy and the ascetic philosophy which goes with it, no longer pro-
vide the impelling force which moulds peoples, lives, and actions. 
The demand in Russia is for greater personal liberty, for more 
consumer goods, for better education and for more access to the 
ideas of the outside world. This newly entrenched class in Russian 
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society is a powerful barrier against any return to the ideas of the 
Stalin period. The generation which experienced the ardour of the 
revolution is passing, and policies based on ideology are passing 
with them. In their place there is developing a new, more prag-
matic approach to foreign policy and to economic problems. In 
this respect, the Russian revolution is following the pattern of 
other great revolutionary movements in history. There is a certain 
inevitability about this historical development. 
This is the background to our conference, and it must give us 
hope that the ideal which we have had before us all these years of 
a unity of the whole of Europe can eventually be attained. But we 
have to work for it, and that is why we are here. 
In recent years we may have underestimated the potentiality of 
courageously stating our political beliefs to the peoples of Central 
and Eastern Europe. This was because of a feeling that we in the 
West were impotent to do anything to improve the situation in 
those countries; and the tragedies of Eastern Germany and of 
Hungary naturally increased this feeling of helplessness. But, when 
I look back, I feel sure that this attitude was a profound error. 
B Y upholding the cause of the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe we shall not only bring comfort to their peoples by ex-
tending to them the hand of friendship, but we shall also be 
advancing our own ideas of freedom and democracy. In these days, 
through the power of radio, television and other means of mass 
communication, ideas travel very fast and with enormous political 
force wherever they are boldly proclaimed. 
I have been working in the European Movement since its in-
ception. And one of the lessons which all this work has taught me 
can be summed up in three words: Never give up. In spite of the 
difficulties which we face in the West today in our efforts to unite 
our nations, I remain convinced that we shall in the end resolve 
our problems and bring unity to this Continent. Looking around 
at this great gathering, honoured by the presence of the Belgian 
Prime Minister who is at my side, I feel hopeful that our message 
- "that we extend the hand of friendship to the peoples of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, and work to include them in our unity" 
- cannot fail to penetrate into every comer of those countries and 
with far-reaching results. 
Address by SENATOR ETIENNE DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN 
Chairman, Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement 
WESTERN ATTITUDE TO THE COMMUNIST WORLD 
WHEN, in 1952, the Commission for Central and Eastern 
Europe held its first congress in London, no one could guess what 
the principal consequences of nuclear armament would be. In this 
field, the power of the United States was still far greater than that 
of the Russians, but it was morally impossible for America to 
make use of that power except in a case of manifest aggression. 
At the level of conventional armaments, however, Europe had not 
yet established a balance of power. I remember saying then: "At 
this moment, confronted by an enemy who knows nothing but 
force, we cannot, without making ourselves ridiculous, brandish 
a sword that is not yet forged." 
Nevertheless, the situation appeared to be fluid. Some people 
talked about 'rolling them back', others were counting upon a re-
volt of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe with such sup-
port as the West might be able to render. The Communist terror 
had broken all resistance inside Eastern Europe. Contacts with 
countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain were more com-
pletely severed than at any other time. Still it was believed that 
this paroxysm could not last and that better days would come. 
Few had yet understood that, from the moment when both East 
and West were in possession of nuclear arms, war had in fact be-
come impossible. With this consequence: that there no longer 
existed any means by which the Slav nations invaded in 1945 could 
be wrested out of the Russian bloc by force. From that moment, 
Senator de la Vallee Poussin 
all speculation about the opporessed nations re-entering Europe, 
about the economic order it might be possible to propose to the 
liberated peoples and about the resumption of cultural relations 
with them - all this turned out to be nothing but idle speculations. 
We now face a fundamental reality that we must learn to re-
cognize: the line marked by the Iron Curtain separating the powers 
of the East from the free world is a militarily insuperable barrier. 
Moreover, the present frontier marked by that fateful line will 
endure, more or less, so long as the two greatest Powers are strong 
enough to hold the nations in their orbits. The examples of Jugo-
slavia, of Albania and of Cuba have shown, however, that it is 
growing more and more difficult for those Powers to use their 
military forces to prevent the peoples within their zones from 
changing their political regimes. 
What is all this leading to? 
The Iron Curtain is becoming partly transparent; its stability 
remains. The great Europe is for the present out of sight. In com-
pensation, other prospects are opening up. A policy better adapted 
to the circumstances is conceivable, and allows us to entertain 
some hopes, limited, but reasonable. 
The Western world seems to have completely escaped the Com-
munist menace by which we were still deeply disquieted a few 
years ago. It is more prosperous than ever and, thanks to prodigi-
ous advances in science and techniques, still has marvellous pros-
7 
pects of development. The capitalism of 1960 bears little resem-
blance to that of the last century. Our society, which is perhaps 
contacting new vices, is more and more immune to the criticisms 
of a Leninist ideology. In years to come it will be even more 
transformed. 
No one can guess the lines of its future development. Everyone 
may hope the civilization of the free countries will maintain its 
progress in the forefront of human evolution. 
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, a harsh climate of ideo-
logical and racial intolerance still prevails. Religions, and especi-
ally the Orthodox religion, are still persecuted, and the tyranny of 
the State is all the more cruel because it is enveloped in mystery 
and employed with methodical cunning. The policy of the regime 
towards the Jews also calls for condemnation. Their synagogues 
are closed, the use of the Hebrew language is forbidden, the 
assimilation of the Jews is prevented, and so is their emigration to 
Palestine. Yet, in spite of all, the light of faith still shines within 
millions of souls; and in Communist society the spiritual values of 
justice and charity survive, as forces no less powerful and re-
volutionary than in our own. Their activity and fertility are, on a 
longer view, incalculable. 
What is important is that the Stalinist tyranny has vanished. The 
Communist world has ceased to be monolithic and immobile. 
Everything has begun to move, and the forces now at work in free 
Europe are also acting very powerfully upon the peoples further 
east. It is in the light of these inevitable and increasingly rapid 
changes that we must envisage the future of the nations of Central 
Europe and consider how we can help their people, whom we regard 
as brothers. For they, like us, are people of Europe, who since the 
Middle Ages have shared with us in all the transformations, the 
trials and the triumphs that heralded the birth of the modem 
world. It is. therefore, not only a question of helping them, but 
rather of how Europe can recover and maintain, with such vital 
centres of European culture as Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and 
Moscow, those relations that were so fertile in past centuries, and 
without which our Western cultures will soon feel diminished and 
mutilated. 
If we consider the Soviet society of today, we can see several 
forces at work. The Communist Party is still its political pillar. 
The head of the Party continues to exercise a more or less absolute 
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authority, which is rarely held in check. Krushchev, however, has 
no longer the power of Stalin. It would be extremely difficult for 
him to re-establish the reign of terror. He, therefore, has to face, 
and cope with, forces of opposition that we in the West are unable 
to estimate. The old Stalinist groups have not been destroyed; 
there are embers that might yet flare up again. 
On the other hand, the rising standard of living, the increasing 
opportunities of movement, the resumption (albeit partial) of in-
tellectual contacts with the West, the growth of schools and culture 
- these things are causing the intelligentsia to blossom out into 
more and more independent and audacious opinions. 
The intelligentsia is beginning to constitute, as it did under the 
Tsars, a political class, animated by a critical and often a rebellious 
spirit. Of course it has no authority in political affairs. But no one 
can now prevent the radiation of its anonymous and penetrating 
influence. All classes, and the Party itself, are exposed to this 
contagion. Anyone who believes in the dynamism of ideas and the 
power of the mind must attach outstanding importance to this new 
development which, barring unexpected developments, may be re-
garded as irreversible. 
FACE TO FACE WITH REALITIES 
APART from the intelligentsia, other novelties are appearing in 
the midst of the ideological conformity which was the pride and 
the strength of Communism. Coteries and movements are emerg-
ing. The Party and the 'apparatchiki' do not always take the same 
point of view. A ruling class is being created, which tends to per-
petuate itself by heredity, and is already provoking some restiveness 
in the masses. 
The development of the Soviet economy also brings it face to 
face with realities. Marx-Leninism was inspired fundamentally by 
the vision of large-scale industry, thanks to which the Soviet record 
has been marked by successes in the heaviest industry and tech-
nical progress in vast public works. American industrialists, who 
cannot be suspected of any partiality towards Communism, have 
reported that in metallurgy the achievements of the regime are 
such as American industry might well emulate. 
Nevertheless, some other results have been lamentable, and 
there are problems for which valid solutions have yet to be found. 
The relative enrichment of the country demands a rapid multi-
plication of goods for consumption. This cannot be refused to a 
society exasperated by privations for nearly half a century. But 
does the Marxist ideology provide a blueprint for producing, within 
the framework of State supremacy and bureaucracy, the abundance 
of goods needed to satisfy a public which is growing ever more 
numerous, varied and exigent? From some points of view, this is 
the most important aspect of the economy, since industry is made 
for man and not man for industry, and it would seem that it has 
not yet found its master mind. 
There is another problem. Confronted by our European Com-
munities, the Communist world also wants to organize itself. Be-
tween Russia and the 100 million inhabitants of Central Europe, 
it would like to set up some kind of Common Market like our 
own. One would think that it might be easier to regulate the ex-
changes and promote division of labour between states that prac-
tise the methods of authoritarian planning. But the Russian ex-
perience, so far, is that its Comecon lags far behind free Europe, 
and that the division of labour and production between the satellite 
states and Russia is difficult to organize. Russia's power might 
enable it to impose upon these other nations plans that were 
scientifically conceived and at least apparently reasonable. But 
whether that would satisfy the peoples in question is doubtful. 
Anyhow, the Russians are not aiming at this. It would mean the 
virtual incorporation of all these economies into Russia's national 
planning, which not even Stalin dared to attempt. As it is, each 
country makes a plan of its own, and the Comecon endeavours, by 
successive approximations, to establish rules for co-ordinated and 
complementary production. Up till now, after a very bad start be-
tween 1946 and 1950, the results of the new policy appear to be 
very limited. 
Lastly, there is one sector in which the failure of the Com-
munist ideology seems to be demonstrated by the facts; that is, in 
agriculture. When Krushchev came to power he was already urging 
the vital necessity of correcting Stalin's agricultural policy. The 
subject had always interested Krushchev, and one cannot doubt 
that he has given it his closest attention. Anyhow, he has frequently 
changed both the methods and the planning. And yet this Russia, 
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which was the granary of Europe under the Tsars, this Russia 
which then lived in oppression but not in hunger, lives today in a 
state of chronic food shortages. The good soils of the Ukraine 
seem to be deteriorating. 
When we survey the Communist world and its present problems, 
we cannot but draw some significant conclusions. 
First, that Soviet Russia is beyond all doubt the country upon 
which the burden of military expenditure weighs most heavily, 
and threatens in time to become intolerable. Today, such expendi-
ture in the case of the seven Powers of Western European Union 
represents five per cent of their national income, in the case of 
America 11.25 per cent and in the case of Russia eighteen per cent. 
Since Russia is also the country which has the most pressing need 
of economic and social investment, everything points to its having 
arrived at the parting of the ways. Since it does not choose war, it 
must seek disarmament, and play the card of peace and internal 
development. 
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This means that, in the near future, the Russian authorities will 
have to cope with an irresistible upsurge of nationalist demands. 
As soon as a little liberty is doled out by an oppressive regime, 
people's appetite for freedom becomes irrepressible and is bound 
to take the form of nationalism in regions which were once States 
and where national groups have long been leading a minority ex-
istence. Even the Communist governments of Central and Eastern 
Europe, as the dominant Russian Communist Party is left with 
less powerful means of action at its disposal, and as their own 
peoples recover the instruments of freedom, thanks to the develop-
ment of culture and the growth of contacts with the free world -
even these governments must yield more and more to the popular 
demand for emancipation and independence. With Krushchev's 
advent, the Russian power has tended to withdraw. But an author-
ity delegated to the local governments is not enough. For when 
they have to act on their own responsibility, the only basis of 
popularity they can count upon is the awakening national con-
sciousness of the Eastern peoples. So they inevitably fall back 
upon the politics of a nationalist Communism, oriented towards 
more and more explicit independence. 
What, on a more or less long-term view, will be the outcome of 
this irreversible evolution, already so largely under way? It might 
provoke, especially if it went too fast, a shock of recoil. The 
Russian power, with its Communist regimentation and the innum-
erable means of action at its disposal, provides Krushchev and his 
successors with all they would need, in order suddenly to interrupt 
or even annihilate any movement of national revival. 
And if, by misfortune, it should ever appear to the Russian 
authorities that the Western Powers are playing this card in order 
to demolish the military power of Communism, it is practically 
certain that the Russian government, at whatever cost, would react 
without mercy. But on the other hand ,if the internal evolution of 
the Communist world remains no more than internal, if it owes 
nothing to any direct suppor·t from the forces of the West, such a 
reaction from the Russian State would be considerably less likely. 
In fact, its regime is caught in a dilemma. It must either tolerate 
a normal evolution which, in the nature of things, must finally 
establish freedom and independence in the Communist world itself. 
Or else, from fear of that emancipation, it must interrupt that 
progress, break up what has developed - and, by doing so, con-
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demn the regime and the whole world of the East to flounder m 
immobilism and inertia, for the sake of an ideology that is be-
coming more and more obviously artificial. 
In view of these prospects, sufficiently well-defined to be the 
basis for a policy, what should be the attitude of the West? 
First of all, the West must remain true to itself. It wants peace 
and security. It has decided to take no aggressive action and it has 
the greatest interest in convincing the Russians of its will for 
peace. At the same time, it should vigorously affirm its determina-
tion to make no concessions which might endanger the security of 
the free world. One point of importance would be gained if the 
Russians could be convinced that they are under no threat of 
military action from America and her allies so long as they, for 
their part, give no sign of wanting to upset the present balance of 
power by force. The second point upon which Western policy 
should be affirmed without reservation, is a determination to keep 
its moral ideal, its principle of freedom, flying over the world like 
a flag. The rights of the individual, the right of peoples to decide 
their own destiny, the whole philosophy of the rights of man, be-
long to the West, not as its property to be cultivated for itself, but 
as the ideal that the West proclaims everywhere and always. Just 
as, in regard to armaments, the West must maintain its will to 
peace, so in the realm of ideas the West must always remember its 
message. 
THIRDLY, in European affairs, it is impossible for our commu-
nities to disown, as foreigners, nations which have always formed 
part of the life and culture of our continent. There is nothing 
imperialistic in that affirmation. We are not concerned to define 
the frontiers of some ideal or possible Europe. We are simply 
concerned to re-state that nothing which is or has been European 
can be foreign to us, and that the whole of Europe is still open to 
all those who freely wish to profess themselves European. 
These three ideas determine the practical position of Europeans. 
To the nations of Eastern Europe, they offer no aggressive action. 
On the other hand, they remain champions of the rights of man, 
especially of the right of self-determination of peoples. They should 
give their political and diplomatic support to all peoples who 
share their moral values, and they should undertake always to 
pursue economic and cultural policies adapted to the needs and 
the pre-occupations of their friends in the East. 
The economic union of Europe may present trading difficulties 
to countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Such difficulties 
will arise in the nature of things, and we cannot postpone or even 
slow down the building of Europe on their account. On the other 
hand, the Communities should always take care to study every 
means of maintaining the closest relations with the peoples behind 
the Iron Curtain, compatible with the building of Europe. 
The same is true on the cultural plane. European culture must 
be a radiating culture. It cannot be stopped at any frontier, or by 
any Iron Curtain. In itself, it is but the disinterested opening-up 
of ways towards the conquest of the mind and the knowledge of 
the world. Europe should, therefore, in complete reciprocity, allow 
all possible exchanges between all men. The richness and the de-
velopment of our own culture depends on it. We have more and 
more to learn from the experience accumulated in the East. 
Europe offers this opportunity without ulterior motive. She no 
longer fears the contagion of Communism. Her own doctrine re-
quires her to seek, everywhere, whatever may widen her knowledge, 
improve her vision of the world and elevate her ideals. Culture 
cannot be imposed: it offers itself. Whoever refuses it, or cannot 
understand or cannot bear it, only shows his weakness. 
Nothing could be more embarrassing for Communism, nothing 
more destructive of its prestige in its own sphere, than an indefinite 
maintenance of the mentality of the ghetto. The Communist world 
and the free world confront one another. The future alone can 
decide between these antagonists and say which has responded 
better to this challenge of history. In this present time, at all 
events, to take up this challenge is a proof of strength; to refuse 
it would be to betray doubt about one's cause. 
To conclude: the policy of Europe, deprecating all aggression 
and any threat of it, should present itself, on the other side of the 
Iron Curtain, as the will to a peaceful confrontation, in which 
Europe offers herself as she is, with all her successes, her defeats 
and insufficiencies, to the judgment of her adversaries. By the fact 
of doing so, she is capable of shaking to their foundations all 
opposing ideologies if they do not measure up to the challenge. 
On the economic plane, if we really want to serve the countries 
on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and to do so effectively, the 
Communities and the other European nations must define the 
action they propose to take, and agree as to what they can ask. It 
is clear, especially in our view, that relations with the nations of 
the East will become progressively easier on the economic plane, 
step by step with their attainment of certain amount of political 
liberation. Without this no real human contact is possible. 
At the cultural level, on the other hand, there are relations 
which, if they are to be fruitful, have to be organized and, in 
certain sectors, organized methodically. Can each of the European 
countries, alone and separately, pursue its own policy of cultural 
relations with countries behind the Iron Curtain. That is doubtful. 
It would be advisable, that as a minimum measure, the heads of 
departments dealing with cultural relations in the various Western 
countries, should meet periodically to agree on common policies. 
THE attitude that we propose is not meant to obtain a deter-
minate result. Any enterprise of that kind would be beyond our 
reach. It is simply a matter of trying to find out what relationship 
between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe will be 
most conducive to the desirable evolution of the Communist world. 
Trusting in the value of our ideal, we believe that the forces at 
work must lead the world of the East along the path of progress, 
and that this progress will facilitate relations with them. From a 
purely idealist point of view this policy is, without doubt, the 
most - and even the only - practical one we can pursue today. 
One final word: The great obstacle in our way, which is paralyz-
ing the resumption of more normal relations between East and 
West, is obviously the present status of Berlin. This certainly 
presents a particularly delicate political problem, and there can be 
no question, in this domain, of Europe making any concession to 
the principle she most firmly maintains: the right of peoples to 
self-determination. However, I did not want to touch upon this 
question, because it requires a special study. Here I would only 
observe that the problem of Germany cannot be isolated, nor 
separated from the whole. But some progress in the normalization 
of East-West relations, and the overcoming, little by little, of the 
fear of aggression and the present baleful mistrust, is the most 
useful - and indeed the most necessary - result to be hoped for 
from any fruitful negotiations on the German problem. 
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THE 
INSTRUMENT 
OF 
PERSUASION 
Address by LORD ST. OSWALD 
Vice-Chairman, Central and Eastern European Commission 
WE are gathered here from a number of European countries 
to seek some steps towards restoring independence to some of the 
oldest and most illustrious nations of the civilised world. There 
can be no disgusing the implication in our theme that at present 
their rightful independence is being refused to them. There can be 
no pretence as to where we place the responsibility for this refusal. 
Clear as this must be in our theme, and central to our delibera-
tions, we are also agreed that the cure for this condition will not 
be found through bellicose speeches or proposals, still less through 
bellicose actions. It will come through persuasion, which breaks 
no bone and spills no blood. There has been too much breaking 
of bone and spilling of blood in this Europe of ours - some of it 
in our own experience - for civilised men to contemplate any 
more, if it can humanly be avoided. Our instrument is, therefore, 
that of persuasion, and it must be as highly developed and finely 
tempered as the most sophisticated weapon of war. Our strategy 
must be one of deep penetration, directed to the minds and 
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reasoning capability of the Soviet leaders and the satellite rulers. 
A short while ago, the British Prime Minister stated his opinion, 
once again, that we could be entering a new and better era in re-
lations with the Soviet Union. We who are observantly acquainted 
with Sir Alec Douglas-Home know that he does not speak for 
effect. He speaks from conviction, backed by reason. A statement 
of that nature from him is something from which we can all draw 
significant hope. 
The most obvious benefits of such an achievement, to the mind 
of the individual, must be, firstly, what it represents in terms of 
increased security for his own countrymen and, secondly, for the 
world at large. For all of us here, there is a third and vital human 
dividend to be obtained. In particular, those of us who feel our-
selves to be Europeans cannot congratulate ourselves while Europe 
remains divided by an arbitrary and deeply resented frontier. It 
would be no favour to the Soviet leaders to leave them in doubt 
about this. It is so positively in their interests to be aware of it, 
that we owe it to them, and to our mutual hopes of peace, to make 
it plain. 
We, in the West, have put our beliefs to the test. In the past six 
years, in Africa alone, twenty-five countries - one hundred and 
twenty-six million people - have been given their national in-
dependence by the willing act, the deliberate and coherent policy, 
of European Governments: seventeen of those millions by Bel-
gium, forty-nine millions by France, and sixty millions by Britain. 
The same has been happening in Asia, also as deliberate policy by 
the former colonial powers of Europe. The more widely and com-
prehensively these policies are applied and applauded throughout 
the world, the more tragically out of twentieth century context the 
situation of Eastern European nations is seen to be. 
Free nations produce great men, and the world is richer for 
these men. None of us doubt that the new African and Asian 
nations will provide the world with men and women who will 
contribute to the well-being and the aspirations of humanity. But, 
however uplifting our hopes may be as to the contribution to be 
made by the new nations of Asia and Africa, we remain poi•mantly 
aware that, in our own continent, there are nations which have 
helped to build the glorious past of Europe, without which the 
world we live in would be an infinitely poorer place - but which 
are now prohibited from making their true contribution to the still 
greater hopes and the greater needs of the developing world 
around us. 
It is in the interests of Russia, as well as of ourselves, that the 
proud nations of Eastern Europe, which through history have 
given so richly to the understanding, the culture and the progress 
of civilised man, should be able to resume their proper role in our 
affairs. At present, these nations are constricted, and prevented 
from offering the world still more out of their store of active 
wisdom and genius. This is bad for the world. It is tragic for the 
people of these countries, whether living in them or not. 
Some members of those nations are at liberty among us, a few 
at this conference. Their voices are heard less than ours, in the 
plenary sessions. That is not because they have little to say, and 
still less because we have learned all we can from them. It is be-
cause the initiative must be ours, the spur to action must be our 
conscience. Each one of them here is a listening post for his 
people in the other half of Europe. They have come to hear the 
conscience of Free Europe speak and, through their ears, those 
peoples now beyond immediate reach will hear our words, and 
judge us by the sort of consciences we reveal. And they will try to 
measure how soon they can hope that this unnatural, mutually 
harmful separation may be brought to an end. 
THE FULL POTENTIAL OF EUROPE 
To those in honoured exile among us, may I say that so far as 
lies within the power of our imagination and our sympathy, we 
join you in your yearning. Beyond that point none of us can pledge 
anybody's effort but his own. But I hope you will think that both 
the tone and the content of what is being said in this Conference 
shows that there are those in the West who understand and who 
care. I hope you will feel that there are those who will go from 
here, to their different capitals, and apply their energies, their in-
telligence and their influence, to secure that your yearning is not 
endless or unavailing. 
When that day comes, we can look forward to exploiting the 
full potential of this remarkable Continent. That day must come. 
Its expedition is to some extent in our hands. 
EASTERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES ARE 
PART OF OUR UNITY 
By PIERRE WIGNY 
Former Foreign Minister of Belgium and 
Vice-President of the European Movement 
THE feeling I have in attending this meeting of Western 
and Eastern Europeans is of participating in a family re-
union where one understands each other so much better. 
We have met first of all to bear witness: The countries 
of Eastern Europe are not isolated, since in our eyes they 
belong to our family. This family has never been very 
united; Europe has not to be reconstituted, it has to be 
created. A beginning has been made, however, and its 
success should convince us not to be afraid of the Eastern 
c011ntries, even if they are Communist governed .. 
Europe has the advantage of being dynamic. It must 
also have the imagination to spread out, conciliating in 
its unity all its manifold diversities. 
The Eastern European countries are part of this unity. 
In the long run, I see them as full members. Before that, 
they will become associated or, anyway, will be linked in 
some way, in spite of difficulties which imagination will 
have to overcome. And in that way we shall implement 
that old formula which struck me so much: "Europe, this 
old Continent; the Continent of the Future." 
,.,. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- - - ---· 
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EXTRACTS FROM OTHER ADDRESSES TO THE CONFERENCE 
MONSIEUR JEAN REY: The year 1963 and the beginning of 
1964 will surely go down in history as a time remarkable for the 
confrontation of religions - a time when they approached one 
another, not in the hope of mutual conversions, but in an extra-
ordinary endeavour to re-define their reciprocal attitudes. In the 
face of this great example, we may well ask ourselves whether 
political convictions ought not to do likewise; whether the time 
has not come for them to enter into a dialogue, not in order to 
convince one another, but to define the position of each in relation 
to the other. That is the spirit in which this conference seems to 
me to be useful. It may not be a bad thing that we, in Western 
Europe, should take a closer look at what we think of these prob-
lems, in preparation for later meetings with those in power in 
Eastern Europe. 
My own contribution will be a modest one. I shall concentrate 
upon what is specifically the aim of the Common Market in its 
relations with the Eastern European countries. The situation could 
be summed up in this contrast: that the countries of Eastern 
Europe continue to ignore the Common Market altogether; yet, at 
the same time, they have never carried on so much trade with us 
as they do now. 
It is curious to see how these countries persist in ignoring the 
Common Market. We have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union or with any of the Eastern European countries. The only 
·meeting ground, apart from private conversations, is the United 
Nations, and more specifically, the Economic Commission for 
Europe. Up to now, sixty-five countries have accorded diplomatic 
recognition to the Common Market; that is, two-thirds of the 
world. The only two groups which still ignore us are the countries 
of Eastern Europe and some of the Arab countries. 
This abnormal situation creates increasing difficulties, not for 
us, but for the Eastern European countries. One fine day the 
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Russians will just have to perceive that the European Community 
exists. What, then, must we do? 
If the countries of the East take this first step of establishing 
diplomatic relations with us, we should be able to reach a further 
stage, that of a comparison of their attitudes and ours towards the 
external world. For it is certain that we have different policies with 
regard to the "third world" and to world relations as a whole. It 
would be most useful if we and the countries of the East could 
compare our attitudes. We shall have an opportunity at the world 
conference of the United Nations to be opened in Geneva in April. 
The countries of the Community, the Community institutions, 
our Parliament at Strasbourg and our Commission in Brussels are 
prepared for this dialogue, whenever the occasion presents itself 
and wherever it may lead. Will this yield results? I would rather 
not anticipate, for obviously all this is bound up with political 
questions. We saw this plainly enough in our negotiations with 
Britain. It was political and nuclear difficulties which broke up 
these negotiations and the same thing may well happen with the 
Eastern countries, leaving our economic difficulties unresolved. 
That is no reason for not taking up the problems of each sector 
separately, whenever we can do so. 
MONSIEUR RENE MA YER: As Chairman of the French 
Council of the European Movement, I applaud the initiative in 
organising this conference, and would like to thank all those who 
have prepared it, and made it possible. They have allowed us to 
restate what has been a constant doctrine of the European Move-
ment from the very beginning: Namely, the refusal to acknowledge 
the amoutation of Europe. This is a fundamental concept which 
one should never give up, and the European Movement, since it 
was formed, has never accepted the amputation of which Europe 
became a victim. 
We know that the situation has changed in the West, where 
Europe has become organized, and in the East it changes every 
day. Above all else there are facts which we cannot but acknow-
ledge: for instance, a few days ago the New York Times carried 
a picture of a Soviet-American cultural commission sitting in 
Moscow. I think that such a picture would not have been seen a 
few years ago. One might say that it is good, bad, favourable, or 
risky, but, it is a fact that the situation has changed. 
Free Europe must uphold the rights of man and the right of 
peoples to decide their own destiny. But we also have to think of 
the citizens who inhabit the countries of Eastern Europe. This 
means that we have to choose, and the choice is difficult. Our 
Commissions must study the risks and advantages of alternative 
courses of action. One can always criticise any action which the 
West could undertake to promote improvement in the Eastern 
countries. On the one hand, it can always be said that we are not 
doing enough; on the other, that by doing more we should only be 
consolidating the present regimes. I cannot imagine a policy which 
would not be open to one or other of these objections. 
Consequently, efforts of this kind are difficult to improvise and 
a conference such as this is very important for the light it sheds 
on these problems. In the field of economics especially, it is clear 
that an evolution in the relations between the countries of Eastern 
and Western Europe is under way and will necessarily proceed 
further. Must we reject this on the ground that these countries 
have not yet been liberalised? I believe that there should be some 
way of promoting material progress of a kind which would also 
tend towards the freedom of the individual. If one does not be-
lieve that, one must assume that it is better to accept a policy of 
isolation. I am not of that opinion. 
We are, in fact, helping these countries to liberate themselves 
when we trade with them. We are enabling them to grow stronger, 
more resistant. We want Europe to have a policy in her dealings 
with the countries of the East. But the real question which must 
be faced, before deciding upon a European policy, is whether 
Europe exists. That is not the subject of our conference, but only 
progress towards a political Europe will enable us to have a 
common policy towards the countries of the East. 
AMONG THE SPEAKERS 
Monsieur Jean Rey Monsieur Rene Mayer 
Member of the EEC Commission Former Prime Minister of France 
MONSIEUR PAUL DE AUER: We must do all we can to find a 
European solution to our problems, and one which will make 
possible the re-union of the two Europes. Our policy, and the 
attitude we take up, cannot be the same as in 1952. But the aims 
and objects of our Commission must remain always the same. 
Namely, to ensure, in our countries, respect for the rights of 
man and for the fundamental freedoms and for self-determination. 
We want to live as good neighbours and in friendly relations with 
the Russian people. We are not Communists, and we think it is 
our peoples who should decide the social and economic institu-
tions which best correspond to their interests and aspirations. They 
should be given the opportunity to make that decision freely. 
We do not want to re-establish out-of-date institutions, against 
which, moreover, we were in revolt before we left our countries. 
Nor do we want to destroy those institutions of Communist 
creation which truly serve the interests of the workers and the 
peasantry. We also have social justice at heart. Vengeance, resent-
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ment and hatred have no place in our hearts. It is the future of 
our peoples that is our concern. 
We believe in contacts with Soviet Russia, for they provide us 
with a useful political barometer. We do not, however, believe 
that the time for important negotiations has yet arrived. And we 
must take care to avoid such contacts as may be misinterpreted, 
or create in Eastern Europe a false impression that peaceful co-
existence can be organized and ensured without the previous 
solution of the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Cultural exchanges are highly desirable, but on the condition 
that they are reciprocal. We are not opposed to trade agreements 
with the countries of Eastern Europe, so long as they do not in-
clude the sale of strategic materials, but promote contacts likely to 
raise the living standards of the people of our countries. Each 
case, however, should be studied from the political point of view. 
In the granting of facilities, such as long-term credits, the principle 
of quid pro quo should not be lost sight of. 
What we ask of our friends in the West now, when the hour has 
not yet struck for the negotiation of our problems, is some re-
assurance that they are not indifferent to our case. That they do 
not feel it to be a matter of detail which could be overlooked in 
some package deal. We would ask them not to conclude any agree-
ment by which the unwilling vassalage of our people might be 
prolonged. President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard agreed, on 
December 29th, 1963, that no agreement should be made which 
might perpetuate the division of Germany. We would urge that 
this principle be held no less valid for the whole of Central and 
Eastern Europe, divided from the West by the Iron Curtain. 
SIR JAMES HUTCHISON: When we consider planning for a 
new and wider economic approach to the countries of Eastern 
Europe, we have to bear in mind Kruschev's statement that he 
intends to bring down the West by political and economic means. 
But will not increased contact with the West open the eyes of 
people in the Communist countries? Will not a realisation of our 
standard of living and the freedom which we enjoy cause the 
fanatical belief in their own rightness to fade? So we should start 
with the assumption that all contacts are beneficial. Each contact 
makes a tiny dent in the Eastern armour. 
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Let us look at the present trading position. The trade of the 
O.E.C.D. countries with the East is on the increase, and taken 
overall, has doubled between 1955 and 1962, in money values. 
Consistently, the East has sold more to Western Europe than vice 
versa. Whether this will continue to be so with the food shortages 
of the current year, remains to be seen. These shortages are being 
made good from America and not from Europe. But the answer 
to this question will be very important. 
Western imports from the East have been mainly raw materials 
and semi-finished goods, with finished goods tending to increase. 
Trade with the West represents for the Eastern bloc a high pro-
portion of their total exports - for the Soviet Union, twenty-nine 
per cent; for Poland, forty-one per cent. Western exports to the 
East amount to only four per cent of our total overseas trade. 
This should give us a strong bargaining position. 
In the East, tentative steps are being taken to widen the system 
of trading, through COMECON. This was set up in 1949 as a 
reply to the Marshall Plan. It now aims at a more compact or-
ganization, covering a population of 300 million people. It has not 
the same wide aims as EEC, with a customs union and freedom 
of movement of capital and labour. But it aims to become a co-
ordinating influence in foreign trade, with interchange of informa-
tion on the political, economic, technical, scientific, administrative 
and military fronts. Also, it seeks to promote specialisation in in-
dustry, and standardisation, and to create, within the system of 
bilateral trading, an area of multilateral payments. 
National perspective plans will be subject to centralised direc-
tion and with overall Soviet influence. This overall influence is by 
no means welcome in some of the Eastern European countries. 
Recently, there has been set up the Moscow International Co-
operation Bank, linked with COMECON, and providing machinery 
for trading between members. But will it provide convertible fin-
ance for trading with the West? And will the Eastern European 
countries submit to the dominance of the Soviet Union, which is 
implicit in the COMECON conception? 
What then of the future, from the Western point of view? 
Clearly, foodstuffs, semi-finished and finished goods from Eastern 
Europe will suffer from the Common Market outer tariff, in the 
same way as goods from other countries not in EEC will suffer. 
Incidentally, former British and no doubt French territories, now 
independent and in the early stages of development, will turn to 
Communist countries to sell, with the attendant political risks, if 
they are shut out of Western markets. In 1962, trade between 
COMECON and developing countries rose nineteen per cent. 
If we are to sell more to Eastern Europe, we must also be pre-
pared to buy. Should we not make a close examination as to 
whether we could, for example, switch some of our oil purchases 
from Arab countries, which are poor customers and very unstable. 
Indeed, this whole problem needs a co-ordinated examination by 
all the O.E.C.D. states, including an examination of Western 
agricultural policies. 
Until prices and a market economy play a proper role in the 
East, it would be unwise to dismantle quota systems for defence 
against dumping. Simple tariff agreements would give the East an 
advantage. The West should cut out the constant under-bidding 
now taking place, and should seek to agree a system of fair-trading 
rules, including credit granting. E.E.C. have made a start on a co-
ordinated policy. But that is not wide enough. The E.F.T.A. 
countries should also be brought in. We should also consider 
where the U.S.A. and China stand in all this. 
May I end by emphasising that all contacts play their part in 
lessening tension. We should encourage them by all the means at 
our disposal. 
PROFESSOR HENRI BRUGMANS: It seems to me that we 
should make this concrete proposal: that the cultural advisers 
attached to each of our Embassies and Legations in the countries 
of Eastern Europe should meet to consider what our cultural 
strategy should be. But please note what I mean by this. There can 
be no question of aggressive intention. There must be no thought 
of "selling" the culture of any West European country to the 
people of Eastern Europe. The aim must be to maintain the fun-
damental unity of European civilisation. But it needs to be done 
according to a plan conceived as a whole. 
One has often been asked whether we in the West are not in 
need of an ideology to oppose that of Marx-Leninism. For my 
part, I think it is a blessing not to be cramped in the yoke of any 
dogmatic ideology. However, we do have certain methods of 
approach, and our experiments in European co-operation are 
important, not only for their economic and social results, but also 
because they demonstrate the value of a certain method of prag-
matic federalism: that is, of respect for legitimate autonomies on 
the one hand and, on the other, the organization of great associa-
tions. In Eastern Europe, where the problems of cultural diversity 
have been, and still are, so acute, the application of this method 
of pragmatic federalism has the authentic value of a mission to 
those on the other side of the Iron Curtain. 
MR. CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW, M.P.: My feeling is that, at 
this time, the most practical step forward towards the unity of 
Europe as a whole is to revive the conception of the unity of 
European culture. This is something which is widely understood 
on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The great figures of European 
culture speak the same language in East and West - a profoundly 
un-Marxist phenomenon on which we can base great hopes for the 
future. May not the European Movement have a role to play here? 
So far East-West cultural relations have been organised on a bi-
lateral basis in Europe, nation by nation. They have undoubtedly 
contributed a great deal towards lessening tension and misunder-
standing, and even though they have necessarily been of a one-
sided character - in view of the control of travel and thought still 
exercised in Communist countries - they have on balance un-
doubtedly worked to the advantage of the non-Communist coun-
tries. Might not these contacts now be developed on a multi-lateral 
basis? Why should it not be possible to have meetings not merely 
between Soviet and British students, as now happens on a wide 
scale, but between students of Eastern and Western Europe? 
The youth and student festivals organised by the Communist 
side have proved themselves worse than useless. Instead of being 
organised between representative people in East and West they 
were organised by Communists in the East and Communists and 
Fellow-travellers in the West. But why should we adopt a negative 
attitude to the basic idea of these festivals? Might not the 
European Movement consider bringing together the youth and 
students of East and West Europe on a representative basis? 
Could not visits of influential people from Eastern European coun-
tries be organised not simply to one Western European country, 
17 
/ 
but to Western Europe - to examine, for example, the institutions 
of European unity at Brussels and Strasbourg? 
Hard experience in the field of British-Soviet cultural relations 
over many years has taught me the difficulties and limitations. 
Nevertheless, I feel sure that in this field there is a positive role 
for the European Movement if it wishes to undertake it. 
DR. JOHANN B. GRADL: The German delegation welcomes 
this Conference. The Federal Republic would like to be especially 
associated with the granting of the right to self-determination to 
the peoples of Eastern Europe. 
The papers submitted to the Conference are based on the 
assumption that considerable changes are taking place in the 
Communist countries of Europe. It is believed that a certain 
rapprochement to the Western way of life can be noticed in the 
Soviet world and it is thus hoped that the political regime might 
undergo a change. 
Such changes cannot be denied. But our hopes should not be 
raised too high. It would be an error to assume that the Com-
munists are about to cease being Communists. They are still 
Communists and wish to remain Communists. The question for 
them is merely, how and in what way they can remain Commun-
ists. If today we notice changes in the Eastern block, these are not 
due to a b~tter understanding, to changes of opinion or an internal 
revolution, but to political conditions in the world. The implica-
tions of an atomic war are known. It is also no secret that if 
journeys between East and West are made easier, this is because 
of the need for foreign currency. That is why we must not pin our 
hopes on this development. We know that the Communists will 
act against us provided the risk involved is limited; Berlin is an 
example of this. 
We must, therefore, not be misled by the prospect of further 
changes. The result would be a policy of waiting, of the status quo, 
of a de facto recognition of the situation in Eastern Europe. The 
West should, of course, keep a close watch on all the changes 
taking place within the Eastern block, but should remain flexible 
in its reactions; the West should pursue a policy aiming at helping 
the peoples of Eastern Europe to obtain the freedom and rights in 
all spheres which we ourselves enjoy. In such a situation it is 
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advisable not to make any concessions without counter-conces-
sions. Otherwise only the other side would gain advantages. At the 
same time our credibility would be impaired. 
I am grateful that M. de la Vallee Poussin at the end of his 
report touched upon the question of Germany. We can only agree 
with his remarks. But I should like to make one further point: 
The problem of Germany cannot be adjourned for ever. There is 
a difference between Germany and the other European countries 
which only increases tension in Europe. There is a difference, if a 
whole nation through adverse circumstances is placed in an un-
fortunate situation, such as the East European nations, or whether 
a nation is divided and the large majority demand emphatically 
that the other part should be free as they are themselves. The 
temporary opening-up of the Berlin Wall, in one direction only, 
does not change the situation. At the same time a youth wishing 
to pass through the Wall in the opposite direction, was shot. 
There is a further aspect: A whole generation is growing up in 
Germany who cannot be held responsible for the crimes of the 
previous generation. This generation hears about their fathers' 
guilt; they know that we put up with everything and offered too 
little resistance. They will ask themselves whether, in view of the 
German fate, they themselves might one day be guilty of the 
same crime. 
It may be thought by some people that we speak only of our 
own problems. But I consider it my duty to mention facts which 
may lead to a conflict, before it is too late. Otherwise you might, 
quite rightly, reproach us one day: Why did you not tell us -
you must have known. 
COUNT EDWARD RACZYNSKI: I have agreed to take part in 
this conference because I believe it is in the interests of my country 
to have with the free world a contact as close and as constant 
as possible. In matters of trade and economics and in the 
cultural field, we should do all we can to promote contacts with 
Central and Eastern Europe. For, I must say that what has been 
done hitherto has not been enough. I do not wish here to preach 
prudence, but, on the contrary, to advise a little generosity. There 
are many initiatives which fail to achieve their desired ends, while 
others do so. What I would like to see would be the successful 
initiatives developed and substantial sums raised to enable a much 
greater number of young people from Central and Eastern Europe 
to study or to complete their studies in the West. Such scholarships 
are rewarding only if they are for at least two years. Something 
more than a brief stay in the West is needed and, for the young 
people, it is possible to do much more than that. 
As regards economic relations, the view that they should be 
extended has been supported on many occasions by my fellow 
countrymen residing in the free world. In particular, they have 
suggested granting of credits for the purchase of consumer goods 
and raw materials, and of equipment needed for the development 
of production. 
Speeches made during this conference have shown that we all 
know how to distinguish between the peoples behind the Iron 
Curtain and the Governments which have been imposed upon 
them. In the cultural field, assistance has to be administered in 
such a way as to benefit those who are really worthy of it, rather 
than the minions of the regime. 
MONSIEUR GERARD JAQUET: Today, the Soviet world no 
longer presents itself as it did. It has not the unity it used to have. 
Certain fissures are appearing. This means that it will gradually 
become possible for the countries of Eastern Europe, not, indeed, 
to free themselves, but at least to have regimes which are not 
those of former days. How can we facilitate this evolution? I 
think we must avoid two opposite errors. 
First, the policy of isolation, based on the idea that the more 
these countries are isolated the quicker they will throw off their 
present regimes. I believe the reverse of this would happen, and 
that such a policy would rapidly bring about greater cohesion in 
the Communist world. On the contrary, we should establish re-
lations on the cultural plane and on the commercial and economic 
planes. This is indispensable. 
The second mistake to be avoided is that of complacency about 
the present situation. We can never deny the necessity for these 
countries to live in freedom. We must, at every opportunity, de-
monstrate the superiority of free regimes over authoritarian re-
gimes. We should affirm this to everyone we meet in Eastern 
Europe. We said this in Moscow without the slightest equivocation 
and we are firmly resolved to repeat it over and over again. 
We must let it be understood that the return of these countries 
to freedom will not be a return to their old regimes. If liberation 
could be achieved only by going back to their former economic 
systems, there would be no chance of that achievement. If men 
thirst for freedom, they thirst for social justice too. We must there-
fore reconcile the notion of justice with that of freedom. It is not 
to the Bolshevik, nor to the old capitalist system that we must 
commit ourselves, but to a new way altogether. 
MR. ION RATIO: One can see at a glance that economic and 
cultural relations between Eastern and Western Europe have been 
growing constantly during the last few years. But the question has 
been raised whether Eastern Europeans, who are dedicated to 
serving their countries, should concern themselves with this. It is 
said that trade between East and West is growing because this is 
precisely what the East now wants and campaigns for and cultural 
relations, as far as the East is concerned, are almost always limited 
to sending to the West propagandists for the regimes. My friends 
and I have come to the conclusion that there must be a flaw in 
this argument. Framed in this way, the question is what is good 
for the rulers of Eastern Europe. But our concern must be what 
is good for the people of Eastern Europe. We believe in a prag-
matic, functional approach. We feel that a constructive policy 
must not be concerned with fruitless recrimination about the past. 
It must look forward, eager to acknowledge and support any 
measures destined to serve the good of the people in our much-
tried countries. We should recognise it as such, from whatever 
quarter it may come. 
We do not regard the whole of Eastern Europe, either as a 
unit, or as a conglomeration of uniform states. We recognise a 
significant difference between them and plead that they be treated 
by the West independently, each on her own merits. 
An increase in trade inevitably increases the welfare of the 
people engaged in it. Consequently, we do not fear more trade 
between East and West. But this trade must not be conducted for 
political purposes. Contact between peoples across frontiers, the 
exchange of ideas and first-hand acquaintance with other people's 
way of life and ideals, cannot but enrich all those who participate 
in it. Increased trade and cultural relations are not, and cannot be, 
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bad for our peoples. They can be used, as they have been used at 
times by unscrupulous rulers, for their own exclusive benefit and 
in defiance of the interest of the people. But should both East and 
West conduct their trade and cultural relations, not as weapons in 
an ideological war, but as substantive elements in an ever-increas-
ing effort to bring about a richer, fuller life, we are for them. 
DR. W. JAKSCH: A duel between optimism and pessimism has 
taken place. Many questions were put; not all were answered. It 
is agreed that contact with the East European countries is desir-
able. But the possibilities of such contacts vary from country to 
country. For example, Switzerland has not experienced a war. We 
have had Hitler, and the memory of this war affects our relation-
ship with East Europe. The fact that the Soviet block has common 
Communist aims presents a further difficulty. We must examine 
the implications of this different situation in the West and East. 
Above all nothing should be done which might help the regimes 
beyond the Iron Curtain. The decisive factor still remains the will 
for freedom of the East European peoples, the tacit allies of the 
West. Furthermore, in our relations with the Eastern countries, we 
must respect a certain minimum of Western solidarity. This applies 
particularly to cultural exchanges. In Canada I saw a propaganda 
film of Polish origin which disparaged the Federal Republic in 
Canadian eyes. 
It will be very difficult to find a common initiative. Each coun-
try already possesses its traditional contacts. It would be desirable 
if the Cultural Committee could investigate how we could best co-
ordinate these efforts. 
We in Germany and in Berlin are not afraid of contacts with 
the Soviet block. We see no disadvantages in such contacts, even 
if we regret that certain circles of young people on the other side 
have no possibilities of paying counter-visits. The important thing 
is that we stick to our principles and do not lose ground when 
such contacts are established. 
I should like to make a comment regarding the economic prob-
lems. I feel that the EEC is far too modest regarding its success. 
Mr. Rey expressed regret that the Eastern block had not yet re-
cognized the Common Market. This will largely depend on the 
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EEC activities. In our relationship with the East we should con-
sider European developments very much more. 
A last remark: I regret that it was not possible to address a 
message to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Mr. Khrushchev cir-
culated his memorandum about peaceful co-existence. We are 
satisfied with a few statements. We should have drafted a Message 
which might have given the peoples behind the Iron Curtain fresh 
impetus. 
MONSIEUR MAURICE DEWULF: Any initiative taken in what-
ever field may clearly have important consequences for Europe. 
The present-day reality is that tension is lessening. Mr. Kruschev 
speaks of peaceful CO· existence, while President Kennedy spoke of 
active co-operation. If the two super Powers have a different poli-
tical approach, their meeting point seems to be the desire to make 
some progress. It is necessary that Europe, as such, should show 
an active presence in every intiative and every dialogue. 
MONSIEUR ANDRE BOURGEOIS-VOISON: In our cultural 
exchanges between the West and East we should emphasise the 
indispensability of communicating what we have achieved together 
since the last war. We, the members of the European Movement, 
conceived the re-birth of Europe and created a communal move-
ment which has led to results of great importance. Thanks to the 
European institutions, a new method of economic research has led 
us to new conclusions. We approach problems in quite another 
manner, discussing them not only as between separate European 
countries but with the realisation that our countries share a com-
mon destiny. This profoundly modifies our intellectual reactions. 
It is very important to direct attention to this in our exchanges 
between West and East. It amounts to an economic revolution, 
but one which is intellectual and scientific, as well as technical. 
We shall be making a profound mistake if we do not urge its 
importance. 
MR. PAVEL TIGRID: It would be a gross over-simplification to 
maintain that no dangers are involved in East-West contacts. For 
the West, it means accepting at face value the Kruschev concept 
of peaceful co-existence and, indeed, of peace; for the Communist 
countries, it means opening the gates to a confrontation of an 
outdated ideology to the realities and experience of a modern 
world. But it is not with fear but with knowledge, not with creep-
ing suspicion but with missionary zeal that we should engage in 
this confrontation, this dialogue, this ascertaining of mutual 
positions and mutual possibilities. Of necessity, we shall be con-
cerned with principles rather than with policies, with research 
rather than with persuasion, with an analysis of problems rather 
than their practical solution. 
A lot of preparatory work is needed, on our side. This confer-
ence has revealed not only the scope of the problem but also the 
amount of work and research which is necessary to eliminate false 
notions and out-dated dogmatic concepts. It is here that we who 
come originally from Central and Eastern Europe can help. I hope 
that this help will be accepted by the European Movement in the 
spirit in which it is offered, not in terms of the cold war, not in 
terms of illusions of some social orders of the past, but as an 
intelligent, pragmatic, unbiassed approach to this experiment. For 
an experiment it is. 
MONSIEUR KONRAD SIENIEWICZ: It seems to me that the 
essential objective of economic exchanges between West and East 
is to prevent the complete integration of the Central European 
countries in the economic system of the Soviet Union, and to pro-
vide them with an alternative conducive to economic expansion. 
I am also in favour of cultural exchanges between West and 
East because I regard this as the best way of persuading Com-
munists to recognise their mistakes. 
The leaders of our great political movements in the West, 
Christian Democrat, Socialist, Liberal and others, should enter 
into discussions with representatives of Communism in order to 
convince them of the impotence of Communist teaching in the face 
of the scientific progress of the 20th century, and by that means to 
accelerate an intellectual development within Communism itself. 
It seems to me that, in the existing situation, economic and 
cultural contact with Central Europe has become a duty incum-
bent upon Europeans, in order to re-create Europe as a whole, and 
to restore the economic and political equilibrium of this Continent. 
We must bring about direct !'elations betwteen the countries of 
Central Europe and the institutions at Strasbourg. In this con-
nection, it may be opportune to create within our Commission of 
the European Movement, a third Commission - let us call it a 
legal sub-committee - which should be charged with the study 
of the possibility of including these countries in the legal system 
of Europe. 
SUMMING - UP 
By Senator Etienne de la Vallee Poussin 
YOU have come here from the four comers of Europe, all bear-
ing tidings from the Greater Europe. In an atmosphere of goodwill 
and collaboration, of research and obedience to truth, you have 
manifested your will to work for the good of all Europeans, those 
who are with us and those who are still separated from us. 
I think we can draw one very general conclusion from our dis-
cussions. After a long interval of time, this Central and Eastern 
European Commission of the European Movement has been able 
to show its vitality. It has, indeed, reappeared on the surface with 
some splendour, affirming its intellectual vitality and its ability to 
understand the future and to work out appropriate lines of policy 
for the European Movement. 
The business of your Commission is, first and foremost, to 
advise the European Movement. And in a field as important as 
that of relations between West and East, and facing a problem as 
delicate as that of the help we should give to friendly peoples 
divided from us by the Iron Curtain, the service we seek to render 
to the European Movement can be of very great importance. 
We do not forget the peoples of the East, and it is important 
that they should know this.. Of course, we are obliged to adapt 
our activities to time and circumstance. We have, all the time, to 
consider what efforts on our part will be most beneficial to them, 
and will most probably correspond to their wishes. For the pre-
sent, what we are seeking, is the most effective way of helping 
them to healthier economic and cultural conditions. For, as they 
make economic and cultural progress, they will be better able to 
become masters of their own destiny and therefore more likely to 
attain self-determination. We seek to strengthen them in body, so 
that they themselves can save their souls. 
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REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
By PIERRE ABELIN 
Chairman of the Commission 
THE Commission appointed to study economic relations 
with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has con-
sidered various possible views of the subject. It has rejected 
two of them and adopted a third. The first of these views was 
that it would be better not to develop economic relations 
with the countries of the East, in case this should reinforce 
an international Communism which is more eager to gain 
foreign markets and extend its influence than to raise the 
standard of life of its population. This view was rejected. 
The second view was that to extend economic relations with 
the Eastern countries would not be to the advantage of these 
countries, since they are tied willy-nilly to an over-ruling 
economy and have managed to achieve a certain equilibrium 
in their exchanges. This view, also, was rejected. 
The third view was that the development of exchanges 
with the countries of Eastern Europe would improve their 
own economic situation, and the standard of living of their 
peoples, inasmuch as it would enable them to obtain from 
the West some of the equipment, materials and technical 
skills lfhich they need for the fulfilment of their plans of 
industrialisation. This was the view we adopted. 
The expansion of trade will lead these countries progress-
ively to modify their foreign trade methods and their econo-
mic structures, which are at present too closely modelled on 
the Soviet system. Some adjustments in their internal and 
external methods would enable the Eastern European coun-
tries to take advantage of international division of labour, 
which has proved an effective means of increasing national 
income. Thus they would achieve, stage by stage, a certain 
degree of multilateralism in their foreign trade. A further 
step would thereby have been taken towards better inter-
national understanding and a relaxation of tension between 
East and West. 
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The expanding economy of Western Europe, and its pro-
gressive unification, impose new duties upon us in our re-
lations with Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, 
it also relieves us of certain economic and financial anxieties. 
Having agreed these general considerations, the Commis-
sion examined methods conducive to the development of 
trade with individual Eastern European countries. Note was 
taken of the changes in the flow of West European trade 
which have occurred since the war, and which have been 
accentuated by the setting up of EEC, and by important 
developments in agricultural production. 
The principal obstacle to an increase in our trade with 
the countries of Eastern Europe is the difficulty they find in 
obtaining, through their exports, the foreign currencies they 
need to pay for their growing import needs. Various remedies 
were examined by the Commission, in particular: 
(1) Defining by agreement with each of the Eastern 
European countries the criteria for evaluating trade ex-
changes, so as to permit their increase. 
(2) The granting of credits, co-ordinated at a European 
level, as regards their object, which would enable the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe progressively to adapt their produc-
tion to increased trade with the West, which will be chiefly 
in manufactured products. 
(3) A triangular solution, proposed by Professor Bye 
whereby, through European credits granted to Africa, Eastern 
European countries could supply Africa with both consumer 
and capital goods, thereby acquiring financial means which 
would make it possible for West European industry to con-
tribute to the development of trade with the East, without 
financial risk. 
Solutions which would have been impossible a few years 
ago are doubtless becoming easier to apply in view of the 
evolution which has taken place in Africa as well as Western 
Europe, and which seems to have begun in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Commission thinks it de-
sirable that these suggestions, with any others likely to 
supplement them, should be passed on for further study to 
O.E.C.D., the Commission of E.E.C. and to E.F.T.A. 
Moreover, the development of exchanges with the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe will necessitate a more 
and more extensive dialogue with representatives of those 
countries. This dialogue will have to be pursued in a truly 
European spirit and will thus contribute to the unity of 
Europe, which is so ardently desired. 
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CULTURAL COMMISSION 
By HANS OPRECHT 
Chairman of the Commission 
IN summing up the discussion resulting from the reports 
presented to the Cultural Commission, I would say that, by 
and large, members expressed the hope that practical con-
sequences would be drawn from the recommendations of both 
reports. Some sceptical voices were heard, mainly from the 
representatives of exiled political organizations, who believed 
that cultural exchanges carried more dangers than advan-
tages for the West. However, even among the exiled politi-
cians and diplomats, there were those who supported the 
broad principles stated in the reports. This was the opinion 
of Ambassador Edward Raczynski and Ambassador Gaetan 
Morawski. 
I should like to emphasise the views expressed by the 
rapporteur during the discussion, with which I myself agree, 
that the very notion of cultural exchanges implies reciprocal 
advantages. The West has much to offer to the East, but one 
should not forget that the countries of Eastern Europe have 
a very rich and ancient culture. Their contribution is essen-
tial if we are to develop in all its richness and diversity the 
whole of the European cultural heritage. During the last few 
years, there has been an intellectual revival in Eastern 
Europe, in spite of the still existing limits on intellectual 
freedom, and Eastern Europe can offer an original contribu-
tion to the solution of the problems of our times. One must, 
therefore, underline the element of reciprocity in cultural 
exchanges. 
How can we define European culture? It goes beyond the 
notion of "Western culture" and beyond the notion of 
"Christian culture". What we are defending is essentially a 
pluralist notion, no element of which should be lost, whether 
it be Greek, Judeo-Christian, Germanic, Mediterranean, 
Slavonic, Byzantine, or Materialistic. If that is the case, a 
federalist conception would be best suited to our type of 
culture, and I propose that we should adopt a federalist 
viewpoint in our projects for cultural exchanges. 
BI-LATERAL cultural agreements between governments 
are, of course, indispensable, but the cultural exchanges be-
tween East and West would gain a lot if they had also other 
bases - wider, through international organizations, and 
narrower, between local authorities. Private cultural organi-
zations also have their part to play in these exchanges. 
I suggest that the secretariat of the Central and Eastern 
European Commission should select from the reports and 
from the contributions to the discussion, some concrete pro-
posals which the European Movement should adopt and help 
to implement. 
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APPENDIX A 
REPORT PRESENTED TO THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
THE Central and Eastern European Commission believes that 
in the present conditions the development of trade relations with 
Eastern Europe is useful and necessary and should be encouraged. 
We believe that today the cause of freedom will best be served, 
if, rather than isolate these countries, we draw them closer to the 
West and develop our links with them, particularly in the field of 
economic relations. 
Eastern Europe is not lost to the West. The Communist doc-
trine has made surprisingly little impact on the minds of the peo-
ple. The young generation refuses to be taken in. The structures 
are proving ill conceived and ill adapted to the economy which 
becomes more complex as it becomes more industrially developed. 
Far-reaching reforms will have to be carried out. 
The improved East-West relations will make it easier for the 
Eastern European governments to carry out the necessary changes. 
On our part, we in the West can help facilitate the changes so as 
to alleviate the lot of the Europeans in the East, defend the values 
and the principles we believe in and help shape the evolution of 
the Communist structure to something more in line with our own. 
This might have been an unrealistic task in the years gone by. It 
is no longer so today. In the years to come, in the economic as in 
other domains, it might well be that a constructive dialogue might 
be possible with these countries which could bring this about. We 
would welcome such a development. 
The European Movement believes in the ultimate unity of the 
whole of Europe, including countries, such as those in the East, 
which so far have been kept out. The day will come when the 
unity of the whole of Europe will become a reality. However re-
mote it might seem now we should prepare for it and do all we 
can to bring it about. 
Problems resulting from the division of Europe must be ap-
proached and studied in the European spirit. Economic relations 
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with the countries of East Europe are one of them. The growing 
economic unity of Western Europe, and particularly the develop-
ment of the Common Market, makes it both necessary and possible. 
Trade with Eastern Europe is primarily a political problem. 
During these last few years, as the climate of East-West re-
lations has improved, Western Europe has shown increased readi-
ness to develop her economic relations with the countries of East-
ern Europe. Our countries have approached the resulting problems 
in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. On our side few areas of 
trade still remain restricted by political or strategic considerations. 
In most fields the doors are now open. This is not only the case in 
Europe but also in the United States where obstacles to East-West 
trade are being increasingly relaxed. The sales of surplus agricul-
tural products and particularly wheat is significant. 
COMMUNIST BLOCK EFFORTS TO DEVELOP TRADE 
A VAST political problem arises, however, on the Eastern side. 
Since the end of the war the East European countries, for political 
reasons, have been making a sustained effort to develop trade 
within the Communist block. The Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (C.M.E.A.) has been set up to carry out this policy 
and co-ordinate the economies of the member countries. Until 
recently its chief concerns were the confrontation and co-ordination 
of national plans, promoting specialization throughout both in-
dustry and agriculture of the member countries, standardization, 
co-ordination of research, disseminating technical information and 
gathering statistics. In all these fields it can claim certain achieve-
ments to its credit. It has also attempted to co-ordinate and 
sponsor new investments and as a result the character, location 
and sometimes financing of new major industrial undertakings as 
well as the marketing of their products is jointly planned within 
the framework of this organisation. In more recent years it has 
attempted to remove certain monetary obstacles to trade by trying 
to create within the system of bilateral trade agreements between 
block countries an area of multilateral payment, and by setting up 
a bank to facilitate clearings. Although the C.M.E.A. has suc-
ceeded in eliminating some of the more blatant absurdities in the 
inter-block trade, it cannot in any respect be thought of in terms 
of an Eastern Common Market, nor can it ever become one. 
Rather it can be compared to the O.E.C.D. in the West. 
COUNTRIES MUST BE CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY 
HOWEVER similar their economic structures and the problems 
that arise therefrom, even in the case of Yugoslavia who never 
belonged and of Albania who dropped out of the C.M.E.A., we 
should always consider these countries individually and never as 
a group. From the political point of view this distinction is even 
more important as the interests, aspirations and attitudes of the 
East European countries vary and the differences between them 
become more pronounced. 
As a result of this policy of concentration on inter-block trade, 
the pre-war patterns of trade have been radically changed. These 
changes have been further accentuated by the post-war agricul-
tural evolution in the West which limits Western Europe's needs 
for imported foodstuffs. 
It will, therefore, require a deliberate and sustained effort on 
the part of these countries to expand their trade with the West. 
There are strong economic reasons why they should want to do 
so. Only in the West can they quickly acquire much of the equip-
ment, materials and manufacturing know-how needed for their 
ambitious industrial plans. The very development of their indus-
trial production, unavoidably accompanied by increased specialisa-
tion, creates new import requirements. It also requires contact 
with foreign methods and techniques. Finally, the pressure for an 
increased standard of living, more, better quality and more varied 
consumer goods - which has been too long suppressed - is be-
ginning to make itself felt and will call for an expansion of foreign 
trade. The Western world is far and away best placed to satisfy 
these needs. All these economic reasons press for an expansion 
of trade with the West. 
The difficulty lies, however, in the capacity of these countries to 
earn through exports the foreign exchange needed to pay for their 
very considerable import requirements. 
It is unlikely that much increased earning could result from 
greater exports of agricultural products or fuels to Western mar-
kets. The difficulties in this respect are well known. It can only 
come about through an expansion of exports of manufactures. 
Indeed, as the post-war history of Western Europe shows, econo-
mic growth and industrial expansions tend to be accompanied by 
a considerable expansion in the foreign trade in manufactures. 
Greater exports from Eastern Europe of these categories of goods 
would be in keeping with this natural tendency. 
While awaiting payments many Western countries are led to 
grant credits to the East European countries in order to finance 
trade. These credits cover the sale of both consumer and capital 
goods. They are, however, but a transitory measure equally awk-
ward for both sides. In order to prevent a credit race a common 
attitude is presently tending to develop among Western countries, 
though not without some difficulty. The problem, however, arises 
today for the whole of the Western Alliance. 
NECESSARY CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES 
THE improved climate of East-West relations will have a favour-
able influence on trade. It will create better confidence in the 
future and greater stability which will help both sides to plan 
ahead. It should also help the Eastern European governments to 
carry out necessary changes in their economic policies, methods 
and structures in order to develop their foreign trade. Such changes 
are necessary and unavoidable, since they hamper their economic 
relations, not only with the free world, but also with one another. 
Most of the difficulties stem from their very economic structure, 
which is modelled on the Soviet pattern. This was originally de-
vised by the Soviet Union, which aimed at achieving economic 
self-sufficiency. It is inappropriate, however, if advantage is to be 
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taken of the international division of labour which proves again 
and again to be one of the most effective means of increasing the 
national income and hence the standard of living of the people. 
Nor is it suitable, for that matter, to the needs of a modem in-
dustrialised economy. 
Under the Communist system physical planning of production 
and distribution has taken the place of the market forces regulat-
ing the development of free economies. Prices no longer play the 
same function as in the free world and do not provide the yard-
stick for commercial exchanges. The Eastern European countries, 
therefore, do not have the same criteria that we have in the West, 
and indeed, it is doubtful if they have any but the roughest means 
of estimating the profitability of foreign trade. In the absence of 
the price criteria there is no way of fixing a generally applicable 
rate of exchange for any one of their currencies. This prevents 
multilateral trade, and the implementation of a multilateral system 
of payments. Instead, they have to operate a wasteful system of 
bilateral trading through trade treaties defining the value of the 
goods to be exchanged and regulating payments. 
By the same token, the total export earnings within any one 
system of payments matters more than the earnings of any one 
product, the price of which can be adjusted at will, without refer-
ence to its price on the home market. Such adjustments can be 
carried the more easily as all the foreign trade is done by the 
State through a handful of state trading organisations. 
CONTROLS CANNOT LIGHTLY BE DISCARDED 
THE countries of Western Europe have liberalised their pay-
ments with the countries of Eastern Europe so that they can freely 
convert into other currencies the proceeds of their export earnings. 
Although the trade treaties with the West indicate the value of 
each category of Western export, this is largely meaningless as 
only in exceptional cases does any one of them still carry any 
export restriction. They can, therefore, switch their purchases as 
they like as the lists of goods to be exchanged are on the whole 
indicative and not binding. The Western countries, however, can 
hardly lightly discard controls, such as import quotas, on Eastern 
European exports. 
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Cases of unfair trading, and particularly of dumping, on the 
part of Eastern European countries have fortunately not been 
very frequent in the past. Neither have there been many cases in 
recent years of using trade to promote illegitimate political ends. 
It is generally in the interest of the Eastern European countries, 
chronically short of foreign exchange, to sell at a fair price and 
maximise their earnings. As long, however, as they are in a posi-
tion to act differently the free economy countries must be on their 
guard. 
So long as the exports of the Eastern European countries play 
only a marginal part in the foreign trade of the free world - as 
they do at present - the resulting problems are relatively minor. 
Should these countries wish, however, substantially to develop 
their trade with the West - as we hope they will - the absence 
of common criteria for fair trading will be one of the main diffi-
culties to be overcome. 
FREE ACCESS TO BUSINESS CONTACTS NEEDED 
ATTENTION should also be drawn to certain practices of the 
Eastern European countries. Normal contact with Western traders, 
industrialists and bankers is limited to the bare minimum. All the 
alleged political and security reasons are manifestly absurd. West-
ern businessmen should have free and unrestricted access to all 
their business contacts in these countries - including the possi-
bility of establishing agencies and trading outposts. Only through 
widespread and sustained contacts can new business opportunities 
be discovered and trade developed. 
The solution to all these problems will require a great deal of 
good will and understanding on both sides. 
The countries of Western Europe in the formulation of their 
trade policies should take into account the interest of Eastern 
Europe, take steps to develop trade and generally help these coun-
tries to work out satisfactory solutions to their export problems. 
It will be up to the East European Governments however to 
make the greater effort to develop trade as they will have to ex-
pand and diversify their export production with all that this im-
plies as regards investments and modification of plans. Moreover 
they will have to take steps to encourage foreign trade and create 
the necessary climate of good will and confidence. These countries 
will be the first to reap the advantages. 
They should in particular establish close links with the great 
European institutions and organisations, such as the E.E.C., the 
E.F.T.A., and O.E.C.D., in order to study and work out solutions 
to all the numerous problems resulting from an increased trade. 
The European Economic Community has already intimated that 
it would welcome the establishment of diplomatic channels with 
the Eastern European countries. This is indicative of the spirit in 
which a united Europe will approach these questions and the 
Eastern countries should avail themselves of this offer. 
APPENDIX B 
REPORT PRESENTED TO THE 
CONFRONTED by the problem of cultural exchanges with the 
communist world, the West had apparently to choose between two 
solutions: isolation or communication. By a curious paradox, isola-
tion was recommended, in the West, by the most virulent of the 
anti-communists ranging from the advocates of encirclement down 
to the McCarthyists. But Stalin alone was in a position to impose 
isolation by substituting an impenetrable iron curtain for an inter-
mittent and penetrable cordon sanitaire. In fact it seems clear that 
for the West, this choice was only apparent: isolation can be en-
forced only by a totalitarian regime, which is why Stalin so easily 
managed to do it. The West could not do this effectually without 
renouncing the pluralism and the freedoms which are the real 
justification of the case. The Western advocates of isolation were 
not only shackled by this contradiction. Their choice was the pro-
duct of two convictions which they shared with the orthodox 
communists. First, it was affirmed on both sides, with opposite 
emotional emphases, that the communist bloc was monolithic and 
unchangeable - or rather, that its inherent purpose was to develop 
unilaterally, towards the paranoiac world of '1984' (as seen from 
We have indicated above some of the principal problems, but 
many more will arise. As trade develops a wide-ranging dialogue 
on all these matters, carried on at all levels, should prove of great 
benefit in that respect. It should be carried on in the true European 
spirit since it will be held between fellow Europeans and concerns 
European problems. In that way the painful division of Europe, 
at least in this particular economic field, will be lessened and a 
process set in train to prepare the ground for a better future 
which will carry us nearer to our ultimate aim of the unity of the 
whole of Europe. Rapporteur : JOHN POMIAN 
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the one side) or towards the universal classless society (as seen 
from the other). And what is more, those Western anti-communists 
who advised isolation, the cordon sanitaire, showed that they 
shared the communists' own faith in the magnetic power of what 
seemed to them to be, apparently, an idea incarnate, a revolution 
on the march. 
Today however it is obvious to everyone that the communist 
world is neither monolithic nor unchangeable. And it is quite 
equally clear that communism has lost the force of attraction with 
which its millenarian fascination endowed it, though to some eyes 
this was as horrible as the 'Medusa face' described by Thierry 
Maulnier. No longer a Siren nor a Medusa, the Soviet Empire 
now appears to mast men in its true and de-sanctified image as a 
powerful but deeply disunited empire, in no way exempt from 
evolution. 
Finally, all judgements of value apart, only the prospect of 
'liberation' could give even a semblance of logic to the position 
taken up by the advocates of isolation. As the events of 1956 de-
monstrated, the Western powers have renounced any implementa-
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tion of a policy of forcible liberation of peoples under communist 
domination, even if those people themselves revolt and call for 
help. Soviet policy in the Cuban crisis showed that in the opposite 
camp also, any idea that the schism between the two worlds can 
be overcome by physical victory is excluded. So we are henceforth 
committed to that co-existence called 'peaceful' which is really 
competition by all means short of war. 
Mr. Kruschev has expressed his conviction that our children 
will be communists. Probably it is no longer so clear to him as it 
was before the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet schism, that the world 
need only become communist to enjoy lasting peace. Our own 
position is less bound up with a particular ideological conception: 
the communist regime would have only to admit the plurality 
of the world, to allow its subject countries the free choice of their 
destiny, and accord freedom of thought and expression to all its 
subjects, and a lasting international order would begin. 
MYTII OF THE PAST AND A MYTII OF THE FUTURE 
THE attractive power of communism may be said to have been 
based upon a myth of the past and a myth of the future. The myth 
of the past was that every decision taken by the Party was not 
only necessary, but the only right decision. In the eyes of enlight-
ened communists this ineluctable necessity excused the crimes of 
which they were active or passive accomplices. Kruschev's 'secret 
speech' of February 1956 exploded this myth of the past. The myth 
of the future was that the victory of communism on the universal 
scale would amount to the arrival of a unified world. The official 
revelation of the Sino-Soviet conflict in June 1963 has exploded 
the myth of the future. 
The lifting of the curtain over the past ushered in the revisionist 
epoch of communism; for if the Party was not always right, that 
means it is not always right. If it has not always incarnated 
the meaning of history, it has no monopoly of that meaning. And, 
although the Party has admitted much, it has not been able to 
explain, in terms compatible with its ideology, how what it admits 
could have happened. 
The lowering of the curtain over the future is the beginning of 
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the polycentrist epoch of communism. Accentuation of the Sino-
Soviet conflict has been followed by an increase of autonomy in 
the countries which seemed to be the most irrevocably committed 
to the fate of 'satellites': in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia, even in 
Bulgaria. Among communist countries only Albania and Yugo-
slavia seem to hope for the definitive 'excommunication' of the 
U.S.S.R. by China or of China by the U.S.S.R., and they do so for 
analogous reasons, for it is they who would pay the costs of an 
apparent 'reconciliation'. Though all the other communist countries 
multiply their 'good offices', that is not in order to reconcile the 
antagonists, but because if there is, at the centre of the communist 
world, 'an hour that is Moscow's' and 'an hour that is Pekin's', all 
the other hours on the dial are now at their disposal. 
NEW PLURALISM OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 
THIS new pluralism of the communist world is of particular in-
terest to us here, at this Conference of the European Movement's 
Commission on Central and Eastern Europe. In the domain of 
cultural exchanges, Poland played the part of a pioneer. But, whilst 
the tacit agreement that binds the Polish communist regime to the 
real country has hardly ever been infringed in fundamental matters 
- the non-collectivization of agriculture and the modus vivendi 
with the Catholic Church - in the domain of cultural liberties, 
Poland is no longer in the forefront of the bloc. It is the contrary 
evolution that we see in Hungary, where the Kadar regime, after 
accomplishing its sad task of repression, seems to have granted its 
subjects freedoms which are not negligible in their cultural ex-
changes abroad. In the course of 1963, those Eastern countries that 
seemed the most docile in their behaviour as satellites have taken 
unexpected advantage of their freedom of manoeuvre since the 
Sino-Soviet schism. Czechoslovakia is in full intellectual ebullition, 
and quite new prospects for cultural relations appear to be opening 
up with Rumania and Bulgaria. 
In an accompanying Report you will find factual data and par-
ticulars about the cultural exchanges between the West and the 
Eastern European countries. But if we wish to outline here a 
'policy' of cultural exchanges, if we want to discuss the spirit in 
which such exchanges ought to be conceived, we must first speak 
about the U.S.S.R. Indeed, it is only by force that the U.S.S.R. 
is present in the countries of the communist world; and in the end 
it is upon the internal evolution of the U.S.S.R. that developments 
in those countries will depend, even if the degree of their align-
ment is no longer the same as before. 
The communist world is in a profound crisis - of regime, of 
ideology and of structure. Underlying this crisis there is a thirst 
for knowledge, a thirst for objective information, a thirst for truth. 
There lies the indisputable advantage of the Western world in the 
domain of cultural exchanges. For what is in question - freedom 
for individual thought and enquiry - is a reality in the democratic 
countries of the West. The Stalin regime was inaccessible to reason, 
invulnerable to the truth. But from the moment when the Party 
decided, if it were but to ensure its own collective security, to re-
nounce sanguinary purges, it had abandoned the permanent state 
of terror which alone could assure the smooth working of that 
monstrous closed shop. 
POINTS TO EXAMINE IN KRUSCHEV'S SPEECH 
IT is true that nothing in the social or political system of the 
U.S.S.R. guarantees that this change of climate is irreversible. In-
deed, sceptical voices are sometimes heard in the West, casting 
doubt upon the long-term value of cultural exchanges with the 
East. If such exchanges are really dangerous to the Soviet regime, 
they say, if they really tend towards an intellectual liberalism 
which would undermine the orthodox ideology, who can assure us 
that at the first warning the Soviet machine may not go into reverse 
and 're-Stalinize' after having 'de-Stalinized'? 
Upon that point, it is instructive to examine the speech made 
by Mr. Kruschev on the 8th March 1963 before an audience in-
cluding the Praesidium of the Party and the majority of the most 
distinguished personalities in Soviet cultural life; and also to note 
the consequences of this discourse-which in the West was at once 
interpreted precisely as the sign of a 're-Stalinization' of the cul-
tural life. To realize the range of the threats that Mr. Kruschev 
uttered, one must have recourse to some quotations: 
'Let us analyse what would happen to Soviet art if the partisans 
of peaceful co-existence between different ideological tendencies 
had their way with literature and art. In the first place a blow 
would have been struck at our revolutionary conquests in 
socialist art. According to the logic of the struggle, things would 
not stop there. There is no certainty but that these people hav-
ing regained strength would try to attack the achievements of 
the Revolution'. 
The importance that Mr. Kruschev accords to literature and art 
(which seem to him - these are his own words - a veritable 
'Trojan Horse' menacing the foundations of the regime) finds ex-
pression several times over in his speech: 
'Our people and our Party will not tolerate any assault upon 
our monolithic unity. The attempt to impose peaceful co-exist-
ence of ideologies upon us is the manifestation of such an 
attempt. That is why we open fire upon these harmful ideas 
and against their supporters .. .' 
'Abstract art and formalism, whose right to existence in socialist 
art is demanded by some of its advocates, is one of the forms 
of bourgeois ideology. It is to be deplored that certain people, 
including some artists instructed by experience of life, do not 
understand this'. 
Note, in particular, that when Mr. Kruschev speaks of the 
'abstract' and 'formalism' he is using a kind of semantic confusion 
developed in the U.S.S.R. under Stalin. Just as everything which 
was opposed to the Stalinist dogmas was dubbed 'fascist', the terms 
'abstract' and 'formalism' are now arbitrarily attached to anything 
in art or literature that does not blindly follow the directives of 
the Party. Only that confusion can explain why abstract art, the 
origin of which is anti-bourgeois and revolutionary, is in Mr. 
Kruschev's opinion synonymous with bourgeois art. Mr. Kruschev 
did not stop at these generalities. He said that: 
'It sometimes happens that the journeys of our writers in foreign 
countries far from being useful, turn out to be against our 
country ... the visits to France of the writers Nekrassov, 
Paustovsky and Voznessensky have left disagreeable impres-
sions. Kataiev made some ill-considered reflections during his 
journey across America'. 
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Other artists and other writers were belaboured in Kruschev's 
speech. Foreign observers waited with some disquietude for ex-
pulsions or punishments to follow. The reactionary 'aparatchiki' 
of literature and the arts in the U.S.S.R. and those who were 
nostalgic for Stalinism did not conceal their joy. Thus, writing in 
the Pravda of 3 April, 1963, Leonid Sobolev made this comment 
upon the speech of 8 March: 
'An attack - it is what we were waiting for; an attack along 
the whole front, in the matter of teaching, on the plane of 
ethics, in art, in the attitude towards work; an attack on the 
grand scale, well-organized, irresistible! The offensive has been 
launched, and here are the first successes . . .' 
Yet none of these artists, none of these writers whom Mr. 
Kruschev attacked by name has been expelled from the Party or 
from his professional union. Most of them have made ambiguous 
self-criticisms, which leave them entire freedom for future creation. 
Some have refused any self-criticism. 
For example, let us look at an especially striking case, that of 
the sculptor Ernest Neizvestny. Here we have an artist who (what-
ever Mr. Kruschev says) is not at all abstract, but who uses the 
language of modern sculpture in an expressionist spirit. The 
English Marxist critic John Berger described him in the Observer 
as 'a great modern sculptor'. In the speech of the 8 March, Mr. 
Kruschev said of him: 
'We saw last time the loathsome confections of Ernest Neiz-
vestny, and we are indignant that this man, who is not without 
aptitude, who has passed through a superior Soviet school, can 
be so ungrateful to the people. Unfortunately he is not alone in 
this among artists. We have seen other products of abstract art 
too'. 
On the 15 March, Neizvestny declared, in a self-criticism: 
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'The artist should strive to attain to the expressive, and to 
nourish his art with ideas. In fact, the idea has always been the 
cornerstone of expressionism . . . Once again I have said to 
myself: One must work harder yet, one must work better, com-
mit oneself more deeply to the idea, put more expression into 
one's work. Only in that way can the artist serve his country 
and the people.' 
What is this artist saying here, which is not in confirmation of 
the style that is his own? 
On the 21 June, Mr. Kruschev, speaking of Neizvestny before 
the Central Committee of the C.P., said: 
'I want to believe that this is an honest and gifted man . . . 
Perhaps it is out of place, when one is speaking about the ab-
stracts, to refer everything back to the sculptor Neizvestny.' 
On the 20 November, the Tass Agency announces that Ernest 
Neizvestny has received orders for the portraits of several Soviet 
leaders ... 
Since that speech by Kruschev, fear has often been expressed 
that cultural exchanges with the U.S.S.R. will lose much of their 
value, if Soviet art and literature are represented by such as Sobo-
lev, Kotchetov and Serov. But the Soviet cultural delegation to the 
United States last November included the excellent young poet 
Rojdestvensky - the same who, after the end of 1956, wrote in 
his poem 'The Morning' about 'a terrible being who subjected 
men to his power without mercy and who obliged them to serve 
him and him alone'. 
fflE VOICE OF A NEW GENERATION 
IF this is the way of things - if despite all the cries of 'Halt!', 
the setbacks and the counter-attacks of the reactionaries, the live 
forces in the Soviet intellig'cntsia show such a remarkable power 
of resistance - it is certainly not due to the 'clemency' or 'liberal-
ism' of the leaders, but rather because the authors who get repri-
manded are no longer isolated in Soviet society, for they represent 
the voice of a new generation living in a social environment which 
is no longer that of a closed totalitarian system. That indeed is just 
why they get blamed. It is also the reason why it will doubtless be 
impossible to impose any lasting silence upon them. 
If we take it as proven that: (1) The communist world is no 
longer monolithic and that henceforth there is a problem of cul-
tural relations between different communist countries, and that 
these in their turn have relations with the Western and with the 
uncommitted countries - relations which are not absolutely 
synchronized; (2) The Soviet bloc (apart from communist China) 
1s m the throes of a profound crisis, manifest in every domain, 
one corollary of which is a growing desire for individual know-
ledge, for freedom of thought and authentic creation; (3) The 
cultural exchanges between the East and the West are in them-
selves an influence that favours the evolution of the communist 
world - we have yet to consider the spirit which, on our side, 
ought to govern those relations. 
TWO EXTREME WAYS OF LOOKING AT EXCHANGES 
FIRST of all, we must avoid two extreme ways of looking at the 
problem of these exchanges: that of the propagandist, and that of 
the flatterer suffering from an inferiority complex. The propa-
gandist approaches the Eastern countries as though they were still 
totalitarian, denying the transformations they have undergone 
since the death of Stalin. And he claims to address them in the 
name of 'Christian civilization' or of 'humanism', as though these 
conceptions of life or of society were, on our side, fully realized 
by the facts. He talks thus in terms of a Manichaean dualism, as 
if there were on the one side a totalitarian hell, and a Utopian 
democratic society on the other. In doing this, the propagandist is 
throwing away the principal advantage that Western civilization 
can offer to men of the East - the conception of it as the climate 
most favourable to individual knowledge, to the formation of 
objective judgments: whereas, if we admit from the start that this 
dialogue is taking place between two social systems which are 
both imperfect, we are giving prominence to one of the most posi-
tive elements in our society - the ability to admit its own im-
perfections, a prior condition for the power to femedy them. At 
that point, our interlocutor who, as an individual, wants to study 
and even discuss with us the imperfections of his own society, 
finds himself confronted with the very worst thing he has to 
endure every day - the pretensions of a uniform, obligatory 
ideology that tries to disguise if not deny the facts. 
Need we add this: that in the West there are men (and indeed 
regimes) that oppose communism with a virulent hatred, but did 
not, and do not put up any resistance to other totalitarian 
methods? Obviously such persons cannot be representatives for 
the West, any more than the 'aparatchiki' nostalgic for Stalinism 
could speak for the Soviet intelligentsia. 
At the opposite pole to the propagandist is the Westerner who 
is so fascinated by the very possibility of conversation with the 
East that he hates to formulate the slightest criticism in face of 
his interlocutor for fear of bringing the dialogue to an end. It 
must not be supposed that this type of 'flatterer' is recruited only 
from the so-called 'progressive' Western intelligentsia. We know 
of certain international associations, which exist expressly to pro-
mote the dialogue with the East and which include Western per-
sons of every kind of political and cultural outlook; but whose 
leaders, naturally seeking to perpetuate their work, try to exclude 
all real discussion from the dialogue. In its stead they pay mutual 
homage to Peace, to Culture and to Man, regardless of the 
numberless ambiguities that these well-worn words convey to the 
one side and the other. 
A PARADOX ONLY IN APPEARANCE 
AMONG men of the Left in the West, it is those who profess 
Marx or Marxism who are usually least inclined to flatter their 
Soviet interlocutors. This is paradoxical only in appearance. 
'Orthodox' Marxism as it is taught in the U.S.S.R., degraded into 
an ideology, has lost all hold upon reality; and it is not surprising 
that it exasperates the Western adherents to a Marxism that is 
still living and therefore heretical. 
On the other hand, among the best Western writers there are 
some who, without being Marxists, remain fascinated by its ori-
ginal project of a communist society, and their attitude of apparent 
respect for the Soviets' cultural achievements conceal an un-
conscious contempt for the Soviet intellectuals, or for their public! 
They seem, in effect, to be saying: 'Over here we have good litera-
ture but no public. You have a poor literature, but it is what your 
enormous public wants, and we approve of your sacrificing the 
quality of your work to your public.' Several declarations of this 
tenor were made by good Western minds at the encounter in 
Leningrad during September 1963. It seems incomprehensible that 
intellectuals who criticize the low standards obtaining in the 
31 
means of mass-communication in the West, and condemn them 
for 'contempt of the public', should think that an analogous atti-
tude in the U.S.S.R. is a kind of respect for the public ... In the 
U.S.S.R. itself, voices have been raised against that sort of sophism. 
Even an old producer of films like Ivan Pyriev, in an article in 
Pravda in December, 1963, put the critics on guard against under-
estimating the spectators. And the 'Almanac of the Soviet Film' 
of 1957 stated that the conceptions imposed upon producers in 
Stalin's time 'had transformed the art into something redolent 
both of a newspaper and of a class-room'. 
A word remains to be said about one quite understandable and 
respectable scruple that is rather prevalent in the West, and makes 
some writers hesitate whether or not to speak well of another 
writer or artist of a communist country, for fear that praise pub-
lished in the West might do him harm. It seems to us that this 
scruple would have less weight, but for the existence of an ana-
logous and less scrupulous tendency to praise every work from a 
communist country that expresses opposition to the regime, re-
gardless of its quality. Dialogue between writers, between intellec-
tuals and between artists of the East and the West - we do not 
now speak, of course, of that of cultural officials - ought to be 
based upon a mutual respect which excludes propaganda, which 
excludes flattery, and it should be governed by the same critical 
standards as they employ professionally. 
IDEOLOGY DERIVED FROM THE FORCE OF A WESTERN IDEA 
LET us not forget, lastly, that in speaking to communist intellec-
tuals of the East we are dealing with men subjected to an ideology 
that has grown sclerotic, but is derived from the force of an idea 
which was one of the products of Western thought. 
That is what Herbert Luthy underlined in his article published 
in Preuves in October, 1963: it is with a quotation from that article 
that we will terminate this exposition: 
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'The spiritual crisis of communism in power, which has been 
implicit throughout its whole history, in its discords and its 
purges, and is now in full view, has always been the contradic-
tion between the noble project and the abject reality, between 
the end and the means, between the humanist inspiration and 
the technique of totalitarian power, between faith and fact. For, 
as it is expressly said in the new programme of the Soviet 
Communist Party, communist society, unlike all the spon-
taneously formed societies of history, is precisely that society 
which wills to be consciously invented and constructed. In 
communist doctrine, man is a thing that remains to be made. 
'The fundamental problem of communist society lies in this 
challenge that it presents to the spontaneity of the social pro-
cess. It is a problem worthy of reflecting upon. For we ought 
not too easily to believe that the Western model, of a society 
delivered over to the spontaneity and even to the mere muddle, 
of material desires, is patently and indisputably convincing. If 
we consent to ponder this problem, or these two complement-
ary problems, and if we refrain from reducing the debate to the 
elementary polemics of efficiency and of quantitative standards 
of life, we shall discover that, between the communist aim and 
ourselves there still remain traces of a common language, of 
common origins and values which may render the dialogue 
possible and productive. Whereas Nazism, which erected brute 
force into an end, never knew these problematics nor these 
crises. In confronting the East, let us beware that, by denying 
all community of spiritual origination and therefore all possi-
bility of dialogue, we do not also renounce part of our own 
heritage, which is not reducible simply to the apophthegms of 
a pragmatic liberalism.' 
We have restricted ourselves by design, in this Report, to a study 
of the possible incidence of East-West cultural exchanges upon 
the evolution of the communist world, and we have indicated what 
is, to our mind, the spirit that should preside over such exchanges. 
A number of practical problems remain, which certain participants 
in the Cultural Commission of our Conference know very well, by 
having had to face them. Their experience is precious, and it would 
be a happy thought if this Conference enabled them to share 
in it, with others who are pursuing the same aims in Western 
Europe. Our Commission might even, perhaps, outline the 
methods, not so much of 'co-ordination' as of communication be-
tween men who, at the heart of governments, in international or-
ganizations and private associations are directing and organizing 
the contacts between East and West on the practical plane; not justly proud of that prosperity, which it often adduces as a prag-
forgetting the Slav language experts, the sociological specialists matic argument in discussions with the East, to find the funds, 
in the problems of the East, and the writers who have special governmental or private, which may at last enable it to undertake 
experience of Eastern Europe. a programme of study grants and of cultural radiation, comparable 
Finally, our Commission could no doubt point out once again to that which the United States has been pursuing, and steadily 
how urgent it is for Western Europe, today so prosperous and so developing, for several years. 
Rapporteur : K. A. JELENSKI 
APPENDIX C 
REPORT PRESENTED TO THE 
The purpose of this document is to illustrate the pattern 
of existing cultural exchanges between the countries of East-
ern Europe and the United Kingdom, France and the German 
Federal Republic. 
The above countries were chosen as most representative 
for Western European atti./udes towards the problem. Other 
countries, like Austria or Sweden, may develop a slightly 
different pattern due to their special position vis-a-vis the 
communist world. Nevertheless, it is adequate Jo consider 
the material presented herewith in the general context of 
continuous development of East-West contacts in Jhe cultural, 
scientific and tourist sphere. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
THE programme of cultural exchanges between the United King-
dom and the countries of Eastern Europe shows steady progress. 
Poland has taken a marked lead with several hundred scholars, 
specialists and students visiting each country every year. Accord-
ing to the British Council, there are far more candidates on the 
Polish side, wishing to visit the U.K., than there are available 
funds and places. The difficulties of the British side are centered 
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upon finding a sufficient number of candidates wishing to travel to 
East European countries for the purpose of study - for it is the 
general policy of East European governments to adhere to the 
principle of reciprocation. 
Exchanges with Hungary have been particularly fruitful in the 
past three years and show a definite tendency for further develop-
ment. Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia are falling behind, 
yet the latter seems to show more interest in cultural contacts, 
following the recent visit to Britain of the Czechoslovak Foreign 
Minister. 
Another interesting observation regarding the pattern of ex-
changes with Eastern Europe concerns the Eastern European 
Governments' insistence on promoting the visits of technical and 
scientific personnel, rather than the representatives of arts and 
other humanities. The British government, however, is of the 
opinion that the exchanges must cover all fields of arts and 
sciences without favouring either of them. 
GERMANY 
THE cultural relations of Western Germany with the countries 
under 'popular democracy', which hardly existed during the Stalin 
era, have begun to develop since 1956, the year of the first instal-
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ment of the 'thaw' and of 'liberalization' in the Soviet bloc. At 
first, it seemed that the only way of arranging these exchanges 
would be through official channels, under bi-lateral agreements 
between the respective governments. Such was in fact the case in 
regard to cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Cultural rela-
tions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.S.R. 
were regulated by the agreement of the 30 May 1959 (the text 
of which is published in the official bulletin 'Bundesanzeiger' Nos. 
160 and 195), which had been settled in principle during the visit 
of the Federal Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow in September 
1955. This agreement fixes exactly, for a definite period (two 
years), all the categories of cultural exchange to be effected, the 
number of exchanges, the numbers of participants and the tech-
nical means of carrying them out - the organizing of journeys, 
granting of visas, financing, etc. On the German side, supervision 
of the implementation of the treaty devolves upon the 'Zentrale 
Austauschstelle' (central office of exchanges) at Bonn, which in its 
tum comes within the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
There was some expectation that the forms agreed upon between 
the Soviet Union and Western Germany would serve as an ex-
ample for the organisation of cultural exchanges between the latter 
and the other communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Things took a different course however. The method of bilateral 
agreements proved impracticable because of the difference of 
opinion between the governments concerned as to the interpreta-
tion of the status of West Berlin. The Federal Government of 
Western Germany desires that cultural exchanges with the old 
capital of the Reich - which constitutes one of the provinces 
(Lander) of Western Germany - should be included in every 
international treaty to which it is an interested party. 
The communist regimes, on their side, are bound by the Soviet 
theory of the 'three German states', which treats West Berlin as a 
'free city' separate from the rest of Federal Germany. In conse-
quence, they have not agreed, up till now, to put their signatures 
upon any document recognizing the right of the German Federal 
Government to exercise any power over the territory of West 
Berlin. Similar difficulties have also arisen during negotiations 
between the G.F.R. and the U.S.S.R. over the renewal of the 
agreement of the 30 May 1959 that we have just mentioned: the 
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conclusion of a new treaty is still awaited. Naturally the obstacle 
appears all the more difficult to surmount in the case of the satel-
lite countries where there are no precedents to build upon nor 
even any diplomatic relations in the proper sense of the term. 
That is why, for example, the purely informative talks on the 
subject of an eventual agreement between Poland and the German 
Federal Republic, begun two years ago by the intermediation of 
the Polish commercial mission at Frankfort, had so soon to be 
given up. 
STILL, it is not impossible that the latest development in the re-
lations between Western Germany and the communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, where we now see commercial mis-
sions established on both sides, may bring about a change in the 
situation. In the commercial agreements that Poland, followed by 
Hungary and Rumania, have signed with the Federal Republic: of 
Germany, the 'Berlin clau~e· in the Bonn Government's version 
has been ex_2licitly -recog-;;.ized. Will this--break~through on the 
commercial front facilitate an accord in the cultural domain? At 
the moment no one can tell. However, we learnt at the end of 
November 1963 that the Rumanian representatives had exchanged 
views with the authorities of Federal Germany upon the possibility 
of a cultural agreement between the two countries. 
One might, therefore, conclude, with reason, that if the cultural 
contacts of the German Federal Republic with the Central and 
Eastern countries of Europe depended solely upon co-operation 
upon the official plane, the situation today would be practically 
unchanged in comparison with the beginning of the 'fifties'. In 
reality, however, obstacles of a political and diplomatic order 
have been powerless to prevent the growth of these contacts. On 
the contrary, the absence of the governmental element has if any-
thing facilitated them. Today nearly all the 'popular democratic' 
countries carry on cultural relations with Western Germany as 
well as with West Berlin. 
The intensity of these exchanges varies, of course, from country 
to country. And obviously, cultural relations with Federal Ger-
many were not resumed by all at the same time. For instance, in 
the case of Poland, the first contact made dates from 1955, whereas 
Western Germany's cultural exchanges with Czechoslovakia were 
at that time rather rare. It is only since 1958/59 that these began 
to gain momentum; which can be explained, in great measure, by 
the different pace of de-Stalinization in these two countries. And 
apart from this, there are other factors that determine the amount 
and the frequency of cultural exchange between a 'popular demo-
cracy' and Western Germany: geographic proximity, traditional 
relationships prior to the rupture provoked by the communist 
regime; and above all the degree of interest that the West German 
public takes in a satellite country's cultural products. It is prob-
able, for example, that - other conditions being equal - the 
German Federal Republic's cultural exchanges with Czechoslo-
vakia will always be more intensive than those with Bulgaria; 
Czechoslovakia being its only immediate neighbour, linked by 
numerous cultural traditions, whereas Bulgaria is remote and has 
in the past belonged rather to the cultural orbit of France. 
It is of interest to note that the political and ideological schism 
that has now come to light in the communist bloc is also reflected 
in the cultural relations of the Central and Eastern European 
countries with the German Federal Republic. For example, the 
fact that Jugoslavia had disengaged herself from the grip of the 
Soviets fifteen years ago made it possible for her cultural ex-
changes with the free world, including Western Germany, to de-
velop more normally, though without attaining their pre-war level 
or intensity. On the other hand, the political rapprochement be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia which, among other things, has 
brought about the latter's diplomatic and juridical recognition of 
East Germany, has provoked a rupture of her official relations 
with the German Federal Republic because of the Hallstein doc-
trine; and this rupture in turn compromises, for some time, their 
cultural relations. Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union embarked 
upon a policy of easing the situation, the majority of the satellites 
followed suit, and this has also eased the resumption of cultural 
relations between these countries and the West. Meanwhile, the 
circumstance that Albania finished by taking the 'dogmatic' side 
in the ideological quarrel that so convulsed the Communist camp 
and never underwent the two waves of de-Stalinization that the 
other countries were subjected to, may explain why Albanian 
cultural relations with Federal Germany remain at the level of the 
Stalin epoch - namely, at absolutely zero. 
FRANCE 
HE year 1962 saw the confirmation of the hopes born in 1961 
of exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe. If, in some of 
them, the activities of France are still less than they sometimes 
were in the past, there are others, the U.S.S.R. in particular, where 
the position gained by France is not only very favourable but 
privileged. France is in fact the only Western country which has 
lecturers teaching in the great Soviet Universities and educational 
institutions: six in 1961 and eight in 1962. Nor is their work 
limited to the educational domain. They respond actively to the 
many invitations they receive; give addresses on various aspects 
of contemporary France, act as producers of theatrical companies 
and collaborate with the Soviet Universities in works upon litera-
ture, civilization and philosophy. Each one of them is thus, in 
himself, a centre of diffusion not only of the language but of the 
civilization of France. It is not without significance that the one 
French representative in Leningrad should be a cultural represen-
tative; and we can measure the results by the fact that in Lenin-
grad University one can hear Moliere played in French by Soviet 
students. 
There is also French collaboration in the domain of science 
since the nomination of a scientific attache to the Cultural Service 
at the French Embassy. Charged primarily with the organization 
of the exchanges of scientists between the two countries in accord-
ance with the protocols of scientific agreement, this Professor, a 
Doctor of Science, has been cordially welcomed by his peers in 
the various Soviet organizations. 
French cultural activity has continued to develop favourably in 
Poland: new lectureships were reserved for French teachers, and 
a perfecting course for Polish teachers of French, held at Sulejowek, 
met with very great success. There is no doubt that this kind of 
co-operation, which is to be continued, gives the best results for 
improving the diffusion of the French language. 
Rumania and Bulgaria have, for their part, shown a wish to 
increase the number of lecturers in their Universities. Both these 
countries have, during the summer, organized courses intended 
35 
for the teachers of French in their secondary education. Teachers 
coming from France have brought their foreign colleagues infor-
mation that they wanted about the latest pedagogical methods of 
teaching living languages, endeavouring at the same time to present 
various aspects of the France of today, often little known in the 
countries of Eastern Europe. 
Czechoslovakia itself, shortly afterwards, asked for the organiza-
tion of a similar course during the summer of 1963; so it seems 
that pedagogical assistance can be rendered to the teachers of 
French in that country also. 
In Jugoslavia, the application of a system of control to the 
French Institutes, to which the Jugoslave authorities had recourse 
in 1962, did not too badly affect the traditional positions in the 
universities. This year twelve French have taught our language 
and literature throughout the country, from Belgrade to Zadar. 
In Hungary the French Institute, installed in new localities, has 
been developing further. Notably, it has been made responsible for 
the courses for the officials of the Hungarian Ministries. More-
over, a certified teacher was called upon, at the beginning of this 
scholastic year, to undertake the duties of lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Budapest. 
TOURISM 
ALTHOUGH the importance of professional and university-type 
exchanges between Eastern and Western European countries 
should not be under estimated, the tourist traffic is beginning to 
play an important part in the developing East-West contacts. 
In the past few years the patterns of Western travels to the 
countries of Eastern Europe has steadily increased. The relaxation 
of political tension and a growing interest in the countries under 
Soviet domination, combined with a natural search for new and 
"unexplored" tourist areas in Europe have been the main causes 
of this phenomenon. 
The official policy of East European governments is to encourage 
Western tourism in an attempt to gain Western currency, the 
shortage of which is felt so acutely throughout the bloc. Even 
countries like Bulgaria and Rumania, with a retarded pace of de-
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Stalinization, have developed their Black Sea resorts in order to 
attract thousands of Western tourists each summer. Until very 
recently, the governments concerned were reluctant to allow their 
citizens to come into contact with Western tourists, let alone to 
organize tourist excursions to the West. Yet, a wind of change has 
also been felt in those countries and it may be expected that at 
least some Bulgarian and Rumanian tourists will appear on this 
side of the Iron Curtain. We must admit, however, that the prob-
lem is not entirely political. The serious currency shortage may 
act to the detriment of tourist traffic from these countries. 
In contrast, the tourist traffic between Poland, Hungary and the 
West has developed steadily since 1956 (in Hungary since 1958). 
Each year tens of thousands of Polish and Hungarian tourists find 
themselves in the West as guests of their friends and relations 
living abroad. 
In principle, the full expenses of their trips have to be met by 
their Western sponsors. According to the present regulations, the 
total "spending allowance" which an individual traveller is per-
mitted to take out of his country amounts to five U.S. dollars (or 
equivalent). Such a procedure is not only regrettable, but humiliat-
ing to the visitors, who are thus entirely dependent on their spon-
sors' generosity. Nevertheless, the urge to visit the West often 
proves stronger than financial embarrassment, and this is the 
reason why the number of individual visa applications recorded 
by Western consulates in Poland and Hungary is growing. 
Polish and Hungarian State Travel Agencies arrange occasional 
"conducted tours" of Western capitals for private citizens. The 
prohibitive cost of the trips and their irregular schedules ( e.g. 
Polish tours to the West were recently held up for over a year due 
to currency shortage) makes them available only to a limited 
number of candidates. (No more than 1,500 tourists per annum 
in the case of Poland). 
It may, therefore, be said that the present tourist traffic between 
Poland, Hungary and the West depends almost entirely on the 
financial support of Polish and Hungarian emigres and Western 
citizens originating from those countries. 
Tourist traffic from Czechoslovakia can be regarded as a com-
paratively new phenomenon. It concentrates mainly in Austria, 
and to a lesser degree in France, where a number of tourist groups 
have appeared. Individual tourists are still very few. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
THE state of affairs considered above can be interpreted by the 
optimist as "highly satisfactory", since at least a sound beginning 
has been made. Others might come to the conclusion that the re-
sults achieved so far are modest, taking into account the "back 
log" of contacts with the Eastern European countries which, after 
all, form part of the same continent. 
We might, perhaps, ask whether the present situation has de-
veloped in the right direction and whether the authorities are doing 
everything they should in the circumstances? 
Mr. Jelenski has explained in his report how differently East-
West cultural relations could be interpreted in the East and in the 
West. Cultural agreements are certainly insufficient in relation to 
Western aims, particularly since the Eastern side do not always 
adhere to the spirit of the agreements. 
In the light of political realities we are led to the following 
conclusions: 
(a) Further development of cultural relations with countries of 
Eastern Europe serves the cause of freedom in those countries and 
the future unity of the European continent. 
(b) The present frame-work of official cultural agreements is in 
many respects insufficient for the fulfilment of this task. 
(c) More attention should be paid on the Western side to the 
importance of the developing East-West tourist traffic. 
(d) European nationals travelling to the West should be offered 
more help in taking full cultural and educational advantage from 
their trip. 
(Unfortunately, there are very few institutions in Western Europe 
today which take an active interest in promoting East-West ex-
changes. We have recorded in the past cases where students, 
scholars and distinguished visitors from Eastern Europe were 
forced to return home soon after their arrival in the West for lack 
of funds, interest and attention. It would, therefore, be desirable 
to form a European body to raise funds to help Eastern Europeans 
visiting the West. Such help would, naturally, be given on the 
condition that the beneficiary returned home on completion of his 
studies). 
(e) The relaxation of passport restrictions in Eastern Europe 
could be matched with similar facilities on the Western side. The 
present involved formalities and, above all, high cost of visas to 
Western European countries should be revised at the earliest stage. 
(Recently the Danish Government took the initiative by abolishing 
entry visas for all East European nationals, and this step towards 
lowering the barriers of Europe could, perhaps, be imitated by all 
Western European countries). 
(f) In the book exchange programme special attention should 
be paid to subjects dealing with European integration, particularly 
as the people of Eastern Europe have been mis-informed on this 
subject for many years. 
(g) Cultural relations with Eastern Europe should not only be 
considered as an aim in themselves, but should also serve a pur-
pose. Whenever we find that the East European Governments do 
not respect the basic freedom of cultural exchanges - as still 
occasionally happens - we in the West should not hesitate to 
condemn this in the strongest terms, particularly if it happens in 
violation of the cultural agreements. Experience has shown that 
this often produces the desired effect in the East. 
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